tified in passing a measure which did not appear to be the sense of the country, and barely the sense of the House of Commons? It had been also said this was an auspicious time. It appeared to him quite the reverse. The attention of the country from the highest to the lowest, had been engrossed with the consideration of this question; and whatever might be the decision of that night, it was impossible to suppose that it would not occupy their deep attention for some time to come. According to the provisions of the constitution, the time could not be far distant when the sense of the country might be taken in the most direct | manner upon this subject. They would then know with tolerable exactness how to appreciate that increase of converts, as they had been called, to the Catholic cause. They would then see if they were justified in taking the sense of that boasted majority for the sense of the country. He thought not. Protestant security required Protestant ascendancy. Concessions to the Roman Catholics could not follow, because the right to them did not exist-justice did not exact themexpediency did not require them-the public prosperity could not be increased by granting them and they were quite incompatible with that Protestant ascendancy, which was necessary for the wellbeing of the empire.

The Bishop of Llandaff rose and said:My lords;-It is not without considerable reluctance that I rise to address your lordships on the present occasion. I am well aware of the animadversions to be expected by any one who ventures to oppose such a measure as that which is now under our consideration; a measure, in many respects, plausible and attractive; a measure, calculated to make impression not only on unwary and inconsiderate minds, but on some of the best feelings of our nature; a measure also, which comes to us under the sanction of the other House of Parliament, and advocated by persons of the highest talent and consideration. But, my lords, these very circumstances powerfully operate upon my mind, not to shrink from declaring my sentiments, on a matter in which the interests of our religious as well as our civil establishments, appear to me to be so deeply involved. I shall endeavour, how

• From the original edition printed for C. and J. Rivington.

ever, to be as brief as possible in my observations, that I may not detain your lordships longer than I can well avoid from listening to those who may have a stronger claim to your attention.

My lords, if this were a question merely of expediency, a question solely as to the balance of advantages and disadvantages, of conveniences and inconveniences, likely to result from the proposed measure, I might be less disposed to take a part in the discussion. But if the benefits to be expected from it cannot be obtained without the sacrifice of some essential principles of our Protestant constitution and government; then, however desirable those benefits may appear (to me, I own, they appear exceedingly dubious and problematical), I must consider the proposal as one which it becomes not the legislature to adopt.

Now, with respect to the principles to be maintained in this discussion, I conceive, my lords, that I have a right to assume them as points not to be called in question. They have, in fact, been conceded by the advocates of the measure, in former debates; and they are moreover distinctly and expressly recognized in the very preamble of the bill. The preamble sets forth, that the Protestant succession, and the Protestant episcopal church of England and Ireland are established permanently and inviolably. Here is a direct acknowledgment, not only that some religious establishment is essential to the constitution, but also that it shall be Protestant and episcopal.

Assuming this, therefore, as the basis of the whole inquiry, we come to the main question, on what grounds are Roman Catholics excluded from certain privileges and favours granted to other members of the community?

To this question, my lords, I answer, that they are not excluded merely on account of their theological tenets; they are not excluded for holding the doctrines of transubstantiation, of the invocation of saints, the worship of images, or any other points in their creed or ritual, which we deem to be errors and corruptions of Christianity. These are not, properly speaking, the disqualifications under which they labour, nor the true ground of those disabilities which the legislature has thought fit to impose upon them. The real and only ground of their exclusion is this ;that they are (what they do not choose to call themselves), Papists.

My lords, I beg it may be distinctly understood, that I do not mean to use this term as a term of reproach, nor with the slightest intention to give offence. I have too high a respect for the general body of the Roman Catholics, to intend any such thing. But it is necessary, it is unavoidable, in the course of argument I have to pursue, that this their fixed and (I believe) unalterable characteristic should be kept in view. If, therefore, I should happen to use the terms popery and papist more frequently than I may wish to do, or than may be acceptable to many who hear me, I trust it will be excused. I certainly will endeavour to abstain from them as far as circumstances will permit.

What then, is the distinguishing feature of the real papist? It is, my lords, the acknowledgment of the pope's supremacy, -the acknowledgment, that, in certain respects, the pope has an authority over the whole Christian world; and, consequently, that in whatever country, or under whatever government, the members of the church of Rome are placed, they owe to him, as their supreme head, a special allegiance, and are bound, by an obligation paramount to all others, to render him homage and obedience.

To what extent this authority takes place, is another question. There have been times when it was claimed and exercised, as extending both to spiritual and temporal concerns. The power, however, which the popes formerly asserted over temporal concerns, it may be said, has long since died away, and ought not now to be taken into the account. It is true, indeed, that no direct assumption of this power has of late been attempted; and, hence, it is often alleged, that the pretended right is become obsolete, if not extinct. Nor am I unwilling, my lords, to argue as if it were so. Only let me be allowed to observe, that, even to this day, it has never been formally repealed, never authoritatively disclaimed. So long as the decrees of the Council of Trent continue to be the standard of papal pretensions, and that council recognises the authority of anterior councils, this asserted prerogative remains virtually in force. However dormant, it is not absolutely extinct; and were times and circumstances to permit its revival, the authority would still not be wanting to give it effect.

But, my lords, setting aside this part of the pretensions of the papal see, it will suffice for my present purpose to confine

our attention to its alleged supremacy in spiritual matters. This is, perhaps, the most important part of the inquiry, attempts being continually made to represent this spiritual supremacy as not involving any temporal interests, and, consequently, not interfering in any degree with the legitimate powers of the state.

My lords, of all fallacies none appears to me more palpable, more egregious, than that which regards spiritual authority as altogether unconnected with temporal, Theoretically, indeed, they are distinct; but practically, in most cases, it is hardly possible to disunite them. Like the soul and body (I am using Bellarmine's illustration, my lords, not my own);-like the

soul and body, though each have special qualities and special interests of its own, yet they act one upon the other by mutual co-operation, and affect each other by mutual influence. It may be easy to say, this is a spiritual right, and that a temporal right; this is an exercise of civil power, and that of ecclesiastical:-but when you come to apply these to individual cases, they will be found so blended together, as to render their separation always difficult, sometimes impracticable. And this is in reality the main foundation of that alliance between church and state, which exists in almost every well-constituted government, and which sustains the fabric of the British constitution.

I contend, then, my lords, that if the spiritual authority be exercised, to its full extent, by a power distinct from that of the state, and assuming to itself a supremacy in that respect, it must, so far, become a direct infringement upon the temporal authority of the sovereign. But if it be said, that, even in this respect, the supremacy arrogated by the pope over individuals of other states than his own, is become so mitigated, or so diminished, as no longer to give just cause of alarm or offence; then it will be necessary, in order to judge rightly of this, that we examine somewhat more particularly in what this spiritual supremacy actually consists.

Spiritual power, my lords, is twofold; and the two parts of which it is composed have been clearly defined by one of the most distinguished ornaments of our episcopal bench, whom many of your lordships must have often heard in this House with admiration and delight ;-I mean, bishop Horsley. In a speech on the subject we are now discussing, that eminent prelate prerate remarked the just and proper distinction between the "Power of Order" and the " Power of Jurisdiction;" both appertaining to spiritual authority, but "quite distinct, and of distinct origin." The power of order, my lords, is simply and purely spiritual, and can emanate from none but a spiritual authority. It is that power which confers the capability of exercising spiritual functions; or, in other words, qualifies a person to minister in sacred things. This power the sovereign, the temporal ruler of the state, being a layman, cannot possibly confer. He has it not himself, and therefore cannot communicate it to others. It originates in another and a higher source. And this is all that properly belongs to the power of order. The power of jurisdiction goes much further than this. It extends to the entire government of the ecclesiastical body, to the appointment of particular persons to exercise spiritual functions throughout the state, to the rules and regulations by which they shall be directed, to their respective remunerations according to the stations they hold in the ministry, in short, to every thing which, in ecclesiastical, no less than in civil polity, it is the duty of the legislative and executive government of the country to provide, for the general benefit of the community.

Now, it is manifest, my lords, that this latter power, though spiritual in its purpose and effect, cannot be exercised by any other authority than that of the state, much less by any foreign power, without a palpable interference with that authority; neither can it be carried into effect without a perceptible and powerful influence upon men's temporal interests.

It is, however, asserted, that the power claimed in modern times, by the see of Rome, is nothing more than that which belongs to the church only, and which has been expressly disclaimed by the sovereigns of this country, as a part of their prerogative. Let us examine into the accuracy of this assertion.

The true line of distinction I apprehend, my lords, to be this:-spiritual functions belong exclusively to the church; spiritual jurisdiction belongs to the state, as allied to the church, and although exercised by the church, is derived from the state. Nowhere, perhaps, has this distinction been more clearly or strongly marked, than in the 37th article of our church, and in queen Elizabeth's injunctions, which may be considered as decisive upon the point.

The Puritans, it is well known, took offence at the assertion of the regal supremacy in spiritual concerns; misconceiving, as it appears, or misrepresenting, its real intent and meaning. To quiet such scruples, and at the same time to re-assert the doctrine in its full and proper sense, the 37th article declares as follows :"The queen's majesty hath the chief power in this realm of England, and other her dominions, unto whom the chief government of all estates of this realm, whether they be ecclesiastical or civil, in all causes, doth appertain, and is not, nor ought to be, subject to any foreign jurisdiction. - Where we attribute to the queen's majesty the chief government (by which titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended), we give not to our princes ministering either of God's word, or of the sacraments: the which thing the injunctions also lately set forth by Elizabeth, our queen, do most plainly testify; but that only prerogative which we see to have been given always to all godly princes, in holy scriptures, by God himself, i. e. that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be ecclesiastical or temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil doers. The bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England."

Here, my lords, nothing is disclaimed, on the part of the sovereign, but that which, it is manifest, cannot appertain to any temporal power, the right of exercising spiritual functions. And what are those functions? "The ministering either of God's word, or of the sacraments." The sovereign, though supreme head both of church and state, cannot take upon himself to preach, to baptize, to administer the Eucharist, to ordain, to confirm, or to consecrate. These are offices purely and exclusively spiritual: and queen Elizabeth rejects the very. supposition of their belonging to the sovereign as a slanderous construction of her asserted claim to supremacy. But she still maintains, and abates nothing of her title to supreme jurisdiction; nor will allow any states of the realm, whether ecclesiastical or civil, to be subject to any foreign jurisdiction. Her authority is declared (as had been more fully set forth in her injunctions, twelve years before), to extend to "all manner of persons born within these her realms, of what estate, either ecclesiastical or tem

poral, soever they be; so as no other foreign power shall or ought to have any superiority over them." Thus do the injunctions and articles agree together; and from both is drawn the conclusion, that "That the bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England:"no jurisdiction, my lords, of any kind.

My lords, I think it clearly follows from hence, that, according to the fundamental principles of our Protestant constitution, no subject can be considered as paying full and undivided allegiance to the sovereign, whose notions of the regal supremacy do not come up to this standard. If spiritual jurisdiction or authority, in whatever degree, be acknowledged as the right of some other potentate, that, whether it be more or less, is so much subtracted from the supreme authority claimed, and justly claimed, by the head of the state; and the subject who is placed in such a predicament can pay only a divided allegiance to his rightful sovereign; an allegiance, which, however sincere and faithful as far as it extends, is avowedly imperfect in this respect; and, consequently, curtails his right to the same favour and privileges, the same degree of trust and power, which others may enjoy who submit to the state without any such reservations or restrictions.

That the Roman Catholics actually stand in this predicament, cannot surely be denied. I have already adverted to Bellarmine's opinion on this subject, and which he states to have been the commonly received opinion in his day: and your lordships will recollect recol that Bellar

mine was not in the best odour with the see of Rome, his notions of the papal prerogatives not being sufficiently high to reach the views there entertained of the pope's supremacy. His doctrine, my lords, (and he gives it as a moderated opinion between two extremes) is this:"That the Pope, as Pope, has not directly and immediately any temporal, but only a spiritual power; nevertheless, that by reason of the spiritual, he has, at least, indirectly, a certain power, and that supreme, in temporals:"-" That the power of the Pope is indeed properly, in itself, and directly, spiritual; but that by it he can dispose of the temporal things of all christians, when that is required for the end of the spiritual power, to which the ends of all temporal powers are subordinate; for though he has no merely temporal power, yet he has, in ordine ad

bonum spirituale, the highest power over temporals." Again; -"The spiritual power does not mix itself in temporal concerns, but suffers all things to proceed, as before the union, so long as they do not oppose the spiritual end, or be not necessary to obtain it. But if any thing of this sort occurs, the spiritual can, and ought to coerce the temporal, by any way or means which shall seem necessary for its purpose."*-This exposition needs no comment.

But, my lords, how stands this matter in the present day? Will the Roman Catholic subjects of these realms be content to acknowledge the king's supremacy "in all causes, and over all persons, ecclesiastical as well as civil?" Will they allow that the Pope has no spiritual jurisdiction within these realms? Will the Pope himself relinquish his claim to appoint the clergy, and to rule them? Will he forego his superintendance over them in their respective diocesan or pastoral characters, or surrender such points as may interfere with the jurisprudence of this country? My lords, I hardly need say, that hitherto no symptom of a disposition to do this has appeared, either in the Pope himself, or in those who are

* " Tertia sententia media, et Catholicorum Theologorum communis, pontificem, ut pontificem, non habere directè et immediatè ullam temporalem potestatem, sed solum spiritualem; tamen ratione spiritualis habere saltem indirectè potestatem quandam, eamque summam, in temporalibus." s." -Bellarmin. - Bellarm de Potest. Pontif. 1. 5, c. 1.-" Potestatem summi pontificis propriè, per se, et directè spiritualem esse, sed per eam disponere posse de rebus temporalibus omnium Christianorum, cum id requiritur ad finem spiritualis potestatis, cui subordinantur fines temporalium omnium potestatum."-Ibid, c. 5.-" Etsi non habeat ullam merè temporalem potestatem, tamen habere in ordine ad bonum spirituale summam potestatem disponendi de temporalibus rebus omnium Christianorum."-Ibid. c. 6.-" Itaque spiritualis [sc. potestas] non se miscet temporalibus negotiis, sed sinit omnia procedere, sicut antequam essent conjunctæ, dummodo non obsint fini spirituali, aut non sint necessaria ad eum consequendum. Si autem tale quid accidat, spiritualis potestas potest et debet coercere temporalem, omni ratione ac via, quæ ad id necessaria esse videbitur"-Ibid. c. 6. fore, I must insist, that theirs can only be a divided allegiance; and that, therefore, they are disqualified for such an extension of privileges and favours, as may be fairly expected by their fellow-subjects who labour not under similar disqualifications.

I am anxious, however, to fortify myself in these representations by authorities which your lordships may deem unexceptionable. Among those who are commonly reputed to have been what are called high-churchmen, I might name Laud, Stillingfleet, Jeremy Taylor, Leslie the non-juror, Hickes, Atterbury, the two Sherlocks, and bishop Horsley; not to mention a living prelate now near me, who has treated this subject with his wonted learning and ability. All these have (I believe) touched upon the papal supremacy as among the most dangerous errors of the church of Rome.

But these notions, my lords, are not confined to high-church writers; and on the present occasion, I would rather resort to authorities more likely to be well received by the advocates of the proposed concessions to the Roman Catholics; ics; writers, well known to have been zealously attached to the principles of the Revolution, and friendly to the extension of religiousliberty. Among these, I would first mention archbishop Wake, whom I remember to have had the gratification of hearing warmly eulogised in this House; an eulogy in which I can most cordially join. That excellent prelate laboured with great earnestness to effect an union between the English and Gallician Churches; and after a long and patient perseverance in the attempt, had the mortification to find his endeavours frustrated, and the whole scheme abandoned, in consequence of the interference of the See of Rome, and the impracticability of coming to a right understanding upon this point of the Pope's spiritual authority. Other prelates of the same class were Tillotson, Burnet, and Gibson, all strenuous opposers to Popery, yet sincere advocates of toleration. But I pass over these to call the attention of your lordships to those great writers, Locke and Hoadley, on whom I have more than once heard the highest encomiums bestowed in this House: and the point, my lords, to which I request your attention, is the sort of estimation in which the Roman Catholics themselves appear to hold these admired friends of religious freedom. For this purpose, we can hardly

Milner, the oracle of the present day among the English members of the Romish church. These, my lords, are Dr. Milner's sentiments concerning Locke and Hoadley. - "The Socinian Locke, who will not allow of Catholics being tolerated, on the demonstrated false pretext that they cannot tolerate other Christians."-" Bishop Hoadley, who had no religion at all of his own, would not allow the Catholics to enjoy theirs, because he says, no oaths and solemn assurances, no regard to truth, justice, or honour can restrain them. This is the hypocritical plea for the intolerance of a man who was in the constant habit of violating all his oaths and engagements to a church which had raised him to rank and fortune, and who systematically pursued its degradation into his own antiChristian Socinianism, by professed deceit and treachery." So much, my lords, for the good-will which Papists bear towards writers whom, of all others, their Protestant friends are continually holding up as models of liberality of sentiment.

Together with bishop Hoadley, I might also mention Dr. Sykes and others who distinguished themselves in the Bangorian Controversy, as advocates of bishop Hoadley's sentiments on spiritual and ecclesiastical authority. Dr. Sykes, in particular, wrote a tract with this title; "Enquiry how far Papists ought to be treated here as good subjects: and how far they are chargeable with the tenets commonly imputed to them." It is true, that this and other similar publications came forth at or near the time when the Pretender had raised a rebellion in this country, and much of their weight and influence may be supposed to have been derived from that circumstance. But what I particularly wish to impress upon your lordships is this:-that, to whatever occurrences they might owe their origin, the arguments and mode of reasoning contained in them have little reference to any particular crisis; but turn chiefly, if not entirely, on those fixed and unalterable tenets of Popery, which then bound, and still continues to bind, all Papists in obedience to the holy see. It is, in short, their professing a divided allegiance between the Pope and their Sovereign, that renders them, in the opinion of these writers, absolutely disqualified for places of trust and power in the state.

Descending now to our own times, what do we find to be the present state of