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divine things. Man can believe in an eternal free God, by merely hearing a relation concerning him; the ground of this therefore must lie in the soul itself. These views are principally expressed in the introduction to his work on divine things, in which he appears as the opponent of Claudius.
Jacobi overlooked two important points: first, he did not consider that it might be asked him, where faith in his four doctrines is to be found beyond the limits of Christianity? The whole east is destitute of it-the western philosophy knows as little about it; only weak echoings of this truth (these truths) are anywhere to be heard. Only a few individuals among the most cultivated of mankind, have had an indistinct knowledge of them in any period of the world. Jacobi himself borrowed them from historical Christianity, though he was ungrateful enough to deny his obligations. He cannot express himself upon this subject (these subjects), except in terms borrowed from the bible. It cannot, indeed, be said, that we believe these truths merely because they have been historically communicated to us, but because we are related to God; and this relation, even in our present fallen state, is not entirely destroyed, although the fall has blinded and obscured our knowledge. Tradition alone, therefore, is not the foundation of our faith, but this feeling of our relation to God. We find no where beyond the influence of the gospel, the humble temper of a servant represented as the ideal of morality. We find no such character as that of the humble Redeemer; we never meet the idea that true greatness consists in poverty of spirit. However strongly a man may believe on the ground of his own consciousness, yet he must admit, if God had not revealed himself, we should never have arrived at a knowledge of true happiness, and that a revelation was necessary to render these doctrines definite and secure. But Christianity contains something more than these four truths of Jacobi; it contains the plan of redemption; a knowledge of the purposes of God cannot be obtained by intuition, yet here is faith essential. Even admitting, therefore, the possibility of learning the truths referred to, from a different source, it does not destroy the necessity of a historical revelation. 1. After philosophy, in connexion with various other causes, had exercised such an influence on theology, a theological system was formed as the result of all their efforts at illumination. To this system the name of rationalism has been given; a name first applied by Reinhard. The system is, in fact, the same which was previously called deism. This system not only sought to obtain stability for itself, but appeared in decided hostility to Christianity. As to its tenability, it may be remarked, that the rationalist must either undertake to support his doctrines on the ground of reason and argument, or found them on feeling. If he takes the first course, he must do it after the method of the philosophy of Wolf; for that alone undertakes to establish in a demonstrative way the doctrines of God, freedom, and immortality. But the weakness of this philosophy has long since been proved. If the rationalist gives this
up, he must place himself on the foundation of feeling, on the principle of Jacobi; and this is the fact with the most of them. When he takes this ground he loses all right to contend against a believer in the bible. For he can no longer demand of him, that doctrines which are beyond the reach of reason, should be reduced to its standard, and justified before its tribunal. The rationalist must acknowledge that he cannot do this for his own doctrines of the personality of God, human liberty, &c. With the same weapons, therefore, with which he contends against the believer, he is attacked by the pantheist, against whom he cannot maintain his ground. The pantheist declares his proofs were subjective deceptions, and his doctrines anthropomorphic views. The believer in the bible can also object to the rationalist, that his deistical doctrines are drawn from Christianity, although deprived of their glory and power. And further, that this system, excluding the ideas of a revelation, divine government and redemption, presents a problem which does not admit of solution. The idea of God which rationalism contains, is borrowed from the bible; but if God really possessed all the attributes here ascribed to him, it would appear necessary that so wise and good a being should have a nearer relation to his creatures, and give them some surer guide or reference to divine things than human reason, which teaches so many various and inconsistent doctrines, and which beyond the limits of Christianity, has never yet presented the idea of God which Christian deism contains. The rationalist acknowledges the objective nature of morality; but for his certainty on this point he is indebted to revelation, and yet arbitrarily rejects the doctrine of the fall, and of redemption through Jesus Christ. In this way he is led into another difficulty. Whence is evil? The rationalist is obliged to refer it to God, that through the struggle between good and evil, the former might be promoted. Whilst the denier of a revelation makes God the author of evil, he gives no explanation of the manner in which evil can be rooted out of the heart of man. His blindness on this point arises from his having no deep and proper knowledge of good and evil. The positive part of rationalism thus consisting of Christian doctrines deprived of their glory and consistency, is equally unsatisfactory for the human heart and human understanding, particularly in reference to the doctrine of evil.
The rationalist undertakes, however, to prove, not only that Christianity is improbable, but that it is contrary to reason, and entirely inadmissible. In this effort its weakness is most clearly exposed. It proceeds from the principle that God never works without the intervention of secondary causes, and therefore an immediate revelation is impossible. Revelation can only be mediate, and consists of a development of what already lies in the nature of man. Hence arises the distinction between naturalism and supernaturalism; the former regarding every religious communication as mediate, consisting of the development of what is in man; the latter mainaining an immediate communication of divine truth, not derived
from the human mind itself. The rationalist assumes that God, at the beginning, formed the world as a machine, with whose powers, having once set them in motion, he never interferes. This view is, in the first place, false; but, admitting its correctness, the conclusion drawn from it by the rationalist is by no means necessary. For, granting that God does not interfere with the world, it does not follow that he cannot and will not. At most, the improbability, but not the impossibility, of an immediate revelation follows from this
'But the view itself is false; God is not a machinist, who, having finished his work, retires behind; the life in the universe cannot be regarded as absolutely distinct from the life of God. God continues and supports the world by a continual creation, for such in fact is preservation. The life of the world is the breath of Jehovah; its active powers, the working of his omnipresence; the laws of nature are not, therefore, fixed once and for ever. Augustine says, 'Lex naturæ est voluntus Dei, et miraculum non fit contra naturam, sed contra quam est nota natura.' The laws of nature are mere abstractions, which men make from the usual operations of God. It can, therefore, by no means be said, that his unusual operations, as in immediate revelations and miracles, are violations of the laws of nature. There is no essential difference between immediate and mediate operations; it is merely the difference between usual and unusual. And if God would reveal himself as a living and personal being, these extraordinary operations of his power are essential, as they contain the proof that nature is not a piece of dead mechanism.
But the rationalist also endeavours to show the improbability of a revelation upon moral principles. He says it would prove that God had made man imperfect, if later communications and revelations were necessary. But in this objection it is overlooked that man is not now, as he was originally created. In his primitive state, an immediate revelation might not have been necessary, but in his fallen state the case is essentially different. The rationalist further demands, Why was the revelation not made immediately after the fall, before so many generations had passed away? To this we may answer, that God appears to have determined to conduct and educate the whole race as one individual, and in the idea of education lies that of gradual progress.
Finally, it is objected that the revelation is not universal. In answer to this we may say, that the difficulty presses the deist as much as the Christian, because it affects the doctrine of providence. The deist makes (natural) religion and refinement the greatest blessings of men; but why has God left so many ages and nations destitute of these blessings? If the deist must confess his ignorance upon this point, why may not the Christian? Besides this, Christians themselves are to blame, that the revelation has not been more extensively spread; why have they only within a few years awaked to the importance of this work? And why do the rationalists, of all others, take the least interest in it ?'-pp. 599, and seq.
These passages, selected from the concluding sections of Dr. Tholuck's lectures, will give the reader some faint idea of the superlative excellence and value of the whole. But the volume contains many equally important and valuable articles, We beg especially to call attention to a very elaborate and able review of Transcendentalism, extending to about ninety pages. It thoroughly exposes the pantheistic tendency of the various schemes of philosophy promulgated in Germany by its leading sages. It does so by a full and free examination of their works. The direful consequences which have appeared in the spread of infidelity and atheism, both in Germany and France, are held up as a solemn warning both to America and England. The warning is highly seasonable, and will, we trust, not be without effect in opening the eyes of our young divines to the fearful abyss of atheism, into which the German philosophers have plunged. Even the deeply-learned and eloquent Victor Cousin, whose Introduction to the History of Philosophy has been praised and recommended by parties who ought to have detected and branded its absurdities and impieties, is clearly shown to teach pantheism, which is but an old form of atheism; and the entire system of the fashionable philosophy both of Germany and France, is shown to be nothing more than a new edition of Buddhism adjusted to the modern mind. The article in the volume before us expresses considerable alarm at the spread of these systems among the speculators of America. We hope, however, that the efforts made in Germany and elsewhere, which have not been without effect, will prove useful in America, where more attention is paid to the speculations of the Continent than in England. For ourselves and the Christianity of our own country, we must say we are not greatly alarmed at the new philosophy. Individuals may be fascinated by eloquent but empty pretensions. The English mind is too practical and is too familiar with the history of the growth and decay of philosophical systems, to be seduced extensively into the belief that any of them are destined to perpetuity, or are worth the price they demand of renouncing our faith in Christianity. They may serve their purpose of spreading the name of a selfidolized mortal upon all the winds of fame, but time will produce revolutions and transitions in all these novelties, which will place them among the accumulated rubbish of bygone ages -the day dreams of vain and erring men, who have only walked their hour of busy life in the sparks themselves had kindled, hoping to eclipse the orb of day-the fount of light divine, which will still shine for future ages as it does for this, to guide the otherwise benighted pilgrims to their joyful immortality. We ought not to conclude without stating, that the articles
contained in this volume are the following:-1. The Rule or Faith; 2. The Sonship of Christ; 3. The Decrees of God; 4. The Early History of Pelagianism; 5. Original Sin; 6, 7, 8, The Doctrine of Imputation; 9. Melancthon on the Nature of Sin; 10. Doctrines of the Early Socinians; 11. The Power of Contrary Choice; 12. The Inability of Sinners; 13. The New Divinity Tried; 14. Beman on the Atonement; 15. Sacerdotal Absolution; 16. Regeneration; 17. Sanctification; 18. Transubstantiation; 19. Sunday Mails; 20. Bodily Effects of Religious Excitement; 21. Tholuck's History of Theology, (in the eighteenth century); 22. Transcendentalism; 23. Cause and Effect.
We most cordially welcome and recommend the volume as a valuable accession to the theological library, though we must it is not so free from errors of the press as it ought to have been.
Art. V. Elements of Physics. By C. F. Peschel, Principal of the Royal Military College, at Dresden, &c., &c. Translated from the German, with Notes, by E. West. 3 vols. foolscap 8vo. Longman and Co., 2nd and 3rd vols.
On the appearance of the first of these volumes, which treats of the physical properties of bodies having weight, we gave a short account of it, and expressed a hope that the remaining volumes would shortly appear, as the plan of the entire work was well adapted to meet the wants of philosophical enquirers. We are therefore glad to learn from the translator's preface, that the rapid sale of the first volume, and the demand for the others, have induced the publishers to expedite the appearance of those now before us.
The subject of these volumes is 'Imponderable substances or etherial powers in general;' these are classified generally into light, heat, and electricity.
The nature, properties, and effects of light constitute the science of optics, which occupies 140 pages of the second volume. The two theories of light, viz. emanation, or the corpuscular theory, which was employed by Newton, and followed by Biot and Laplace, and the undulatory theory, the hypothesis of Descartes, which has been adopted by Dr. Young, Fresnell, Herschel, and several other eminent philosophers, are both stated, and partially illustrated, but as the principal phenomena are susceptible of explanation on either hypothesis (though some cases can be more readily illustrated by one than by the other), the author, has wisely abstained from showing himself the