How to Solve the Mind-body ProblemImprint Academic, 2000 - 112 pages The mind is the brain. Each mental state -- each hope, fear, thought -- can be identified with a particular physical state of the brain, without remainder. So argues Nicholas Humphrey in this highly readable yet scholarly essay. He offers strong support for his "identity theory" from evolution. His controversial claim is discussed and challenged in commentaries by authors such as Andy Clark (Being There, 1997), Daniel Dennett (Consciousness Explained, 1991; Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995) and Ralph Ellis (Questioning Consciousness, 1995). Humphrey rounds off the book with a response to his critics. An excellent short introduction to the mind-body problem and the study of consciousness. |
Contents
Contributors | 4 |
Andy Clark Phenomenal Immediacy and the Doors of Sensation | 21 |
Naomi Eilan Primitive Consciousness and the Hard Problem | 28 |
Valerie Gray Hardcastle Hard Things Made Hard | 51 |
Natika Newton Humphreys Solution | 62 |
Carol Rovane Not MindBody but MindMind | 82 |
Robert Van Gulick Closing the Gap? | 93 |
Common terms and phrases
action affect-laden afferent areas aspects of sensation awareness behaviour blindsight bodily activities bodily location body surface boundary Cambridge causal Chalmers claim cognitive Colin McGinn colour concepts Consciousness Studies correlation cortex Daniel Dennett David Chalmers Dennett Diderot distinction efferent efferent activity Ellis epiphenomenal equation evolution evolutionary example experience explain explanatory external fact feedback loop feel functional functionalist Gulick happening hard problem Harnad Humphrey Humphrey's account idea identity involves Journal of Consciousness kind M/BP McGinn mental mind and brain mind-body problem mind-brain natural selection nature Newton Nicholas Humphrey object one-concept organism pain panexperientialism perceive phenomenal consciousness phenomenal immediacy phenomenology philosophers physical physicalist prefrontal cortex Press primitive qualia qualitative aspects question Reid representation robot self-organizing self-resonance sensation and perception sense sensory modality sensory responses signals solve the mind-body spatial Stevan Harnad stimulation story things Thomas Reid tion two-concept wriggles