of public opinion in America was mentioned, I imagined that Norman had said "Of course, everything depends on public opinion in the United States." As I read Eden's despatch, I got the impression that Norman was talking of deliberate endeavor "to educate public opinion in the United States" towards the application of measures of force. In closing I said that in the reports to us and the reports to him there seemed to be no conflict of fact, but rather conflict (if the word was not too heavy) of shades and impressions. Lindsay said that what I had said confirmed his views, that he was glad we had had this conversation, which he thought was distinctly illuminating. I replied that I was glad he had brought me the telegrams, since it was helpful to see a picture from both sides. H[UGH] R. W[ILSON] 793.94 Conference/202: Telegram The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State PARIS, November 6, 1937-4 p. m. [Received November 6-2: 15 p. m.] 1570. In the course of a conversation Delbos said to me this morning that he must insist that France should be represented in any committee or subcommittee set up to deal with the situation of the Far East. French interests, represented chiefly by Indo-China, were too great for him to be able to suffer the "loss of face" involved in having France eliminated from any committee. He said he did not care how large any committee might be or what other nations might be included, but he would continue to insist that France should be represented. I have communicated this to Ambassador Davis. BULLITT 793.94 Conference/208: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State BRUSSELS, November 7, 1937-9 p. m. [Received November 8-10:42 a. m.] 22. For President and the Secretary. Enlarging somewhat on the paragraph of my 19, November 6, 11 a. m. dealing with the French attitude, I feel that I should telegraph at greater length regarding a conversation I had with Delbos the other evening. Delbos told me that while he agreed we should make every effort to bring about a peace by agreement he was frankly skeptical of any successful issue of the Conference. He accordingly felt that France, England and the United States should discuss together even at this early date and outside the Conference what we might do in the event of failure. He was not in favor of sanctions against Japan but he was in favor of aid to China. Even this, however, involved certain risks of retaliation and he thought that we should begin discussing probable contingencies. He felt that as Japan would undoubtedly tighten the blockade of the Chinese coast and interfere further with foreign shipping we might begin to consider some system of convoy or mutual protection of our ships in Chinese waters. We might also be considering the situation of Indo-China which was one of the principal means of entry into China. Already Japan had politely warned France that if supplies were sent to China through IndoChina Japan would take a serious view of the matter and although Delbos did not go so far as to suggest that Britain and America should guarantee Indo-China he did suggest that we consider steps to insure free entry to and egress from Indo-China. I pointed out that in a democracy such as ours it would be impossible to make any such commitment in advance and that decisions of this sort are in the final analysis dependent upon conditions at the time and upon public opinion. Furthermore we were now engaged in an attempt to bring about a settlement by agreement and that while so engaged we were reluctant to discuss alternatives in case of failure. Later in the conversation Delbos showed more clearly what was in his mind. He urged that we make a political alignment of the democracies against the dictators. Civilization had been retreating and only an organized front of free nations could put a stop to this retreat. There was only one leader in the world who could organize such a peace front and this was President Roosevelt. He suggested that the latter might call a world conference after adequate preparation to clear up all outstanding political problems. He again reiterated that we should start concerting possible action in the Far Eastern crisis, just Britain, France and ourselves. He claimed that it was useless to expect 18 nations to decide what should be done. I told Delbos that I doubted if this would appeal to the President and that he would probably feel it was useless to try to settle all of the world problems at once if we weren't meanwhile able to settle this one. I do not feel, however, that the Far Eastern problem could be solved at this stage by two or three powers; I conceived the solution to lie in education and moral pressure exerted by all nations big and small and I again urged upon Delbos the advisability of enlisting the active cooperation of the smaller countries in our deliberations. Since this conversation the French delegation has evinced little spirit of cooperation; apart from minor difficulties it has in effect blocked the appointment of a negotiating committee by insistence on being a member regardless of its size. De Tessan,75 who has succeeded as head of the French delegation in the absence of Delbos, told me frankly that the primary purpose of France is that in all circumstances she shall be side by side with the United States and Great Britain on a basis of complete equality. I told him we could not combine with either or both. The foregoing is of interest not only in itself but should be considered as background in connection with my next succeeding telegram. DAVIS 793.94 Conference/201: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State BRUSSELS, November 7, 1937-10 p. m. [Received November 7-9:25 p. m.] 23. Following the approval at today's session of the text of the Conference's note to Japan," I urged, over French objection, that the Conference meet again on Tuesday for the purpose of considering what other steps might be taken. I did this to prevent the impression that the Conference could not function until Japan chose to reply as there were other things which we could usefully be discussing and doing and which would tend to hasten the Japanese answer. This was agreed to. MacDonald " and I both felt it would be good strategy to have Eden return soon, if possible tomorrow afternoon, and for him to suggest that Delbos do the same. Meanwhile two points have come up which are causing me some concern. The first is the composition of an eventual "negotiating committee". In principle everyone agreed that this should contain no more than three members and with the exception of France the consensus of opinion favored a membership composed of Belgium, Great Britain and ourselves. The French however under orders from Paris insist upon being included. We have all felt that a larger committee would be less effective. I have told the French and British that I am fearful that if the committee consisted only of the United States, Great Britain and France it would look to our public too much like a 75 François de Tessan, French Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 76 For text, see The Conference of Brussels, p. 51. "Malcolm MacDonald, British Secretary of State for Colonies. revival of the old World War lineup and also that I thought there should be at least one small power on the committee. To add to our difficulties if France is chosen Italy insists on being included and if Italy is selected Soviet Russia demands membership. The British are not in favor of French participation because they think it would make the committee too large and also because in practice the French are difficult to deal with and their purpose in wishing to be on the negotiating committee is not primarily to solve the Far Eastern problem. They have tried to persuade the French to drop their demand for a place on the committee but in view of their relations with France in the European field they have hesitated to strongly oppose French membership. I offered to let the French have our place on the committee so as to keep it down to three and so did the British but that doesn't suit them because they want us both on and out in front. I have not wanted to oppose the French but have indicated that if France goes on committee Holland should be added so as to avoid appearance of World War front. It looks at present as though we would probably be able and have to agree on a committee of five composed of the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands unless we take a definite stand against such a large committee. If you have any definite opinions as to the size or composition of the committee I would appreciate receiving them by Tuesday morning. The other problem is related to the above, namely, whether or not we should welcome or oppose Italian participation. While I realize that a too closely defined democratic front might militate against successful dealing with Japan yet on the other hand I fear that the public at home might react adversely to including Italy, whose record with regard to treaty observance has been so poor, as a member of a committee set up for the purpose of persuading Japan to observe her own treaty obligations. Please let me have the benefit of your views. The question of German participation has been for the moment sidetracked and while there is still agreement that she could play an invaluable role there is growing doubt as to whether she would cooperate in the right spirit. Spaak said yesterday that he would have their Ambassador in Berlin informally sound out the German Government. It is thought, however, if and when a committee is agreed upon with power to add to its membership it could then be best decided what to do about adding Germany. That is another reason in favor of a small committee. DAVIS 793.94 Conference/211: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State NANKING, November 8, 1937-9 a. m. [Received 1:35 p. m.] 894. 1. We received this morning from Foreign Office following press release: "That China is not in favor of direct negotiations with Japan in settling the Far Eastern conflict, was made clear by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek in an interview this afternoon (November 7th). Generalissimo Chiang expressed himself as being optimistic concerning the military situation, and reaffirmed China's determination to continue her present struggle until justice is reestablished in this part of the world. The following are the principal questions asked and answers given during the interview. Question. What does Your Excellency think if direct negotiations between China and Japan should be proposed at the Brussels Conference? Answer. The proposal you assumed would, if actually made, serve no other purpose than to increase the difficulty of China. Furthermore, such a proposal would be entirely contrary to the spirit of the Brussels Conference. Direct negotiations between China and Japan would merely be another opportunity for Japan to press such terms as were not only unacceptable to China but were also unacceptable to the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. Furthermore, Japan has clearly proved herself a nation with the habit of dishonoring her solemn pledges and violating even most elementary principles of justice. Whatever terms may be reached directly between China and Japan in the absence of effective guarantees would be in danger of being violated by Japan at any moment. In view of past experience, such terms would constitute neither an asset to Far Eastern stability nor a worthy safeguard of China's integrity and independence. Question. What is the present military situation and what is the outlook? Answer. The plan of China's resistance is to preserve her own fighting power and at the same time to exhaust the enemy so that the ultimate object which has prompted China to put [up] a determined resistance may be attained. Temporary gains or reserve [reverses?], therefore, do not affect the final outlook as long as China's capability of resistance remains intact. The fighting during the last 3 months has already shown the initial success of our plan. As far as the Shanghai and Woosung area is concerned, there were no natural geographical advantages nor any strong fortifications that could facilitate our defense. Yet we have been able to hold our enemy there for so long despite their modern armaments on land, air and sea as well as superior transport facilities. And the initiative still rests with us. The losses on the part of the Japanese are probably the heaviest they have sustained under since the Russo-Japanese In Shansi our troops have inflicted heavy punishment on the Japanese forces during the past 2 months. The Japanese have certainly paid a heavy price for a stretch of territory that is restricted to |