that the subcommittee have the same terms of reference as the full Committee. HARRISON 793.94/10284: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) WASHINGTON, September 28, 1937--10 p. m. 7. Department's 2, September 24, 6 p. m., and 5, September 27, 9 p. m. In my reply of September 24 to your 6, September 23, 10 a. m., the subject immediately under consideration was that of a step then in contemplation by the League, namely, the setting up of a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee, together with the question whether the Chinese-Japanese situation should be considered as peculiarly a Far Eastern question or be considered as a question of general world interest and concern. I indicated to you our view and asked you discreetly to foster the view that the whole question should be dealt with on the broadest possible basis and from point of view of general world concern and interest. In the same and in other telegrams, I have informed you that we feel that the League should chart its own course, that we will be prepared to consider concrete proposals which it may present to us, and that we do not desire to suggest either the direction of or limits to action which it might consider and decide upon. Inasmuch, however, as we associate ourselves with its deliberations through authorizing you to sit with the Advisory Committee and the subcommittee, it is desirable that our thought be known to and be understood by you in connection with the contributions which you may be able to make toward enabling your associates to arrive at decisions which may have some practical beneficial effect in regard to objectives which are common to the members of the League and to this country. When, in July, Japan embarked upon military activities in China, this Government, taking full account of evidence presented then and in the past indicative of Japan's political objectives, made public on July 16 a statement of basic principles which in its opinion must underlie peaceful and normal international relationships. On August 23, this Government more specifically, in a statement referring especially to the armed conflict between Japan and China, reiterated various of the principles comprised in its statement of July 16 and emphasized the view that they applied to the Pacific area as well as elsewhere. Inter alia, it called attention expressly to the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. By this we definitely took exception to the course which Japan was following. In addition, in support of our general position, we have taken several definite steps: (1) we have directly appealed to Japan and China to refrain or desist from hostilities; (2) we have repeatedly stated to both parties that our good offices would be available to them in connection with any suggestions which they might make for resort to processes of conciliation; (3) we have repeatedly protested to the Japanese Government against bombing of non-combatants from the air and we have in one instance made public a note addressed by us to the Government of Japan objecting to and condemning such bombing and in another instance, today, made a public statement on that subject. 64 Certain other Governments have on several occasions approached us with suggestions for "joint action". We have regularly indicated that, while we believe in and wish to practice cooperation, we are not prepared to engage in joint action but will consider the possibility of taking parallel action. In every case where we have regarded as intrinsically meritorious possible action also thought of by other governments we have taken action, several times in advance of and sometimes in the absence of parallel action by any other power. In general, we feel that spontaneous separate action, if and where two or more powers feel moved thereto, on parallel lines, is more strongly indicative of serious feeling in regard to matters under consideration and more likely to serve effectively toward attainment of the objectives sought than would be inspired joint action. As the situation unfolds, the military operations of Japan have increased in extent and in intensity. The Chinese Government has amplified its charges that Japan is violating international law and treaty provisions. The Chinese have affirmed their willingness to resort to processes of conciliation. The Japanese, however, have announced that they intend to destroy China's will and capacity to resist and even to overthrow the present Chinese Government. In refusing the invitation of the Advisory Committee they have declined even to confer with other powers with a view to composing the difficulties between Japan and China. It is our feeling that this situation is definitely of universal world concern. The questions involved no longer relate merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and of peace, of international law and of principles of humanity. It is of course true that they involve violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security, and world humanity. I do not believe it possible on a basis of realism to confine consideration of them to any "Note dated September 22, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. 1, p. 504. one forum or to bring them within the focus exclusively of any one existing agreement. Nor do I think it expedient to attempt to say what might be the limit of action which might be taken by the nations which desire peace toward expressing themselves in opposition to the activities which are being engaged in, in connection with the situation under reference, in breach of the peace and with jeopardy to the rights and the security of all nations. We feel that, in action thus far taken, this Government has gone further in the field of efforts calculated to support the general principles of world peace and security and toward indicating disapprobation and disapproval of disregard thereof than has any other nation or group of nations. We therefore feel that efforts of other nations might well be directed now toward going as far as or farther than we have thus far gone along those lines. You should, while making it clear that we do not desire to incite the League to action and that we decline to attempt to chart a course for the League members either individually or collectively, endeavor discreetly to cultivate within restricted circles where confidence will be respected thinking along these lines. HULL 793.94/10305: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, September 28, 1937-midnight. [Received September 28-10: 40 p. m.] 14. Koo spoke to me at the meeting of the Advisory Committee yesterday and asked me to call this afternoon. In reply to his question as to our views respecting proposed subcommittee and our eventual participation I replied that if subcommittee were set up and I was invited I was authorized to sit on same terms as on full Committee. I emphasized that I could make no suggestions as to any line of action to be taken by the League. I explained that in general the question should be dealt with on the broadest possible basis from the point of view of world peace and general interests and I referred to your statements of July 16 and August 23. Koo said he had been reading your statements and had thought that some declaration or resolution might well be made along the lines of the comprehensive principles set forth therein. As regards the proposal to set up a subcommittee he had made it clear to the British and French that he had no objection provided the subcommittee were not used to replace the full committee. He understood his view had been accepted and that the subcommittee would be set up to facilitate discussion, expedite action and report to the full Committee. In this connection Koo explained that he wished to safeguard his appeal to the Council and he did not wish to have it canceled by having the matter brought before the Assembly under article 3 of the Covenant. As to the composition of the proposed subcommittee he said that he had to admit that if it were to be kept a small and effective body, there would be little room for representatives of governments with lesser interest. Koo assured me that he did not seek the imposition of sanctions but that he did desire: first, that Japanese aggression be recognized; second, no assistance to Japan and, third, assistance for China. He then let me read a draft of a resolution in which he had set down his maxima desiderata. By what body it should be considered remained to be determined and was immaterial so long as the Chinese appeal to the Council was properly preserved. After reciting a number of "whereases" amongst which Koo had slipped in a virtual naming of Japan the aggressor, the draft resolution recommended (in spite of his disclaimer regarding sanctions) that that [the?] members of the League undertake: (1) to prohibit the export or permit the transshipment of arms, munitions of war and oil to Japan as well as a list of raw materials including iron, steel, rubber, cotton, wool, motors, and magnetos; (2), to refuse credits to Japan; and (3), facilitate the furnishing of such arms, materials and credits to China. It was also provided that the resolution was to be communicated to non-member states. Koo explained that oil had been put in the first category as it enabled Japan to bombard undefended towns and noncombatants from the air. He also named Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Holland, and Belgium as the countries which he had had particularly in mind in connection with this proposed resolution. Koo then asked me what would be our views. I replied that I could express no opinion whatsoever on that point and recalled the reference to "hypothetical inquiry" in my letter to Avenol. Koo observed that he supposed he would have to wait and see what others would agree to do. He said that he was to see Delbos this afternoon and would keep me informed of developments. 2. Later this afternoon I paid my first call upon my Japanese colleague from Berne. During the conversation Amau pointed out that China and Japan had not been invited to participate in Advisory Committee of 1932. He wondered [if] Germany had been invited this time. He expressed interest in a newspaper report to the effect that we would participate in a conference in London of the signatories of the Nine Power Pact emphasizing that in that event Russia would not participate. He said that he had urged his Government to reply to and not ignore the invitation to the Advisory Committee. Also 205655-54- -4 that the League resolution against bombing would have an unfortunate effect on Japanese public opinion. He compared the British and American attitudes to our favor and expressed the view China was now looking to Great Britain for assistance. She was already being assisted by Russia and that any interference by the League would only serve to complicate the situation and delay a settlement which he thought might not be far off. A settlement would have to comprise Inner Mongolia, northern China and Shanghai. Lastly, he expressed the fear that any interference by the League, that is, virtually Britain, France and Russia, would force Japan into the other ideological camp-Germany and Italy. 3. If at tomorrow's meeting the subcommittee is set up and I am invited to participate I propose to state that "I have been authorized to attend the meetings of the subcommittee within the terms and conditions under which I am attending the meetings of the Advisory Committee". 4. From information now available, it would appear that while the British and French do not wish to name Japan as the aggressor, they will set up the proposed subcommittee and that they are even apparently prepared to discuss, if not restrictions against Japan, some form of assistance to China. HARRISON 793.94/10336: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, September 29, 1937-10 p. m. [Received September 30-9:49 a. m.] 16. Advisory [Committee] met in public session this afternoon. I read your public statement of yesterday. French delegate then proposed that subcommittee be set up to facilitate and expedite work of the Committee. His proposal was seconded by Cranborne who in set speech outlined attitude and action of the British Government during the present controversy based on policy of maintaining peace which "calls essentially for the fullest international cooperation” and "which demands above all the establishment of a friendly understanding between China and Japan." British Government could not "accept the thesis that this is a matter affecting only the parties to the conflict." It is a matter affecting "in greater or less degree many powers with interests in the Far East, whether members of the League or not." British Government has made continued efforts to bring about settlement of the dispute. Since the beginning "there has been close and constant communication" with other powers specially interested in the Far East "and in many of the steps which were taken |