Page images
PDF

pose except by way of threat or bluff. Thus far the Japanese military have succeeded in coercing local Chinese authorities to assent orally or in writing to situations [permitting] Japanese encouraged autonomy movements to be undertaken (1st) under the so-called Tangku truce; 15 (2d) under the so-called agreement between Ho Ying Chin and [General Umetsu in 1935?] 16 and (3d) under the settlement of the Chahar [dispute?] of June 27th 17 and the Japanese military threaten to meet with force any attempt on the part of the Nationalist Chinese Government to suppress these autonomous movements in North China as being in contravention of the above-mentioned three agreements. The Japanese have thus succeeded in obtaining a certain legalization of their military needs in North China which can be extended more or less indefinitely.

3. Japan, Soviet Russia and Great Britain are the three countries immediately involved. Expansion of Japanese interests on the Asiatic Continent will inevitably clash (1st) with the interests of Soviet Russia in the north and (2d) with the interests of Great Britain as the result of interests spread southward. The Japanese are proceeding with their eyes open and have thrown into the discard the League Covenant,18 the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact 19 in order to be free to carry out their policy. It would be absurd for us or the British to accept a non-aggression [pact?] as guaranteeing Japanese abandonment of ambitious plans on the Asiatic mainland.

4. I agree with Davis. The political basis for Japan's acceptance of the League Covenant was the Shantung provisions of the Versailles Treaty.20 The political basis for the acceptance by Japan and the United States of the naval agreement of 1922 21 was the Nine Power Treaty and the agreement regarding non-fortification of our possessions in the Pacific.22 Japan's recent attitude toward the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaty does not in my opinion offer reasonable ground for belief that the political basis offered by Craigie would be of any value.

15

JOHNSON

Signed May 31, 1933, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. 1, p. 120. 16 See Embassy's despatch No. 332, March 27, p. 89.

17 See telegram No. 321, June 27, 1935, 4 p. m., from the Minister in China, Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. III, p. 280.

18 Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, p. 69.

19

Signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. 1, p. 153.

20 See articles 156-158 of the peace treaty with Germany signed June 28, 1919, Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 55, 298. Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. I, p.

21

247.

22 See article XIX of the naval treaty, ibid., pp. 247, 252.

500.A15A5/603 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, January 9, 1936-6 p. m. [Received January 9-1:40 p. m.]

23

7. Department's 2, January 7, 7 p. m.2

1. The Embassy has no knowledge of the treaty negotiations indicated. (See, however, Embassy's 232, December 7, noon.24)

2. The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo about 10 days ago is reported to have proposed to the Japanese Foreign Office a meeting in Nanking to discuss the Sino-Japanese situation. The Foreign Office before acceding desired a list of the points to be discussed which the Nanking Government has not yet produced. Suma [Consul General] in Shanghai [Nanking], has come to Tokyo for consultation and Ariyoshi 25 is reported due here on January 20.

3. My comments on Craigie's ideas as personally expressed to Davis are as follows:

The Japanese military program in North China has not been moving smoothly. The attempt to include the five provinces in the autonomy movement failed. The professors and students movement has manifested a solidarity and determination which took the military by surprise and although they allegedly discount its importance it has caused embarrassment. The Japanese have failed in their immediate objective. Their determination eventually to dominate North China is no less strong but they do not visualize accomplishing this end by military occupation which would greatly increase expenses and would necessarily weaken their defensive manpower in Manchuria against Soviet Russia as well as inviting possible sanctions by foreign powers. It therefore appears possible that their tactics may now assume a different form in which the conclusion of a nonaggression pact entailing Chinese acceptance of the status quo in Manchuria with perhaps some separate agreement for the acceptance of one or more Japanese military advisers at least in Hopei might eventuate. The foregoing is however pure conjecture based on recent developments. I am sceptical as to the likelihood of the conclusion of such a pact.

If such a pact should materialize the present treaty structure in the relation of the powers to China would presumably in effect have become obsolete. It would then be the better part of wisdom to shape our policy having in mind the long future rather than the past and immediate present-in other words to secure the most effective guarantee of the future protection of our interests in the Far East in general and of our relations with Japan in particular.

23 See telegram No. 4 of the same date to the Ambassador in China, p. 3. 24 Not printed.

25

Akira Ariyoshi, Japanese Ambassador in China.

I am not prepared without further study to evaluate all the implications of a non-aggression pact with Japan which would presumably be based on the fundamental principles already subscribed to in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. If however as Craigie opines the present naval status quo might be secured through the conclusion of bilateral pacts between Japan, Great Britain and the United States, I do not think that the idea should be turned aside without the most careful consideration. The time is obviously coming when we must seriously reconsider our whole future outlook and policy in the Far East and although such a reconsideration may raise questions which now, as Davis stated, appear insoluble I am inclined to feel that their alleged insolubility is predicated more on the difficulties of adjusting ourselves to new facts and conditions, however unwelcome these facts and conditions may be, than upon insuperable obstacles. If the Chinese Government should enter such an agreement as Craigie believes "probable in the near future" the new facts and conditions suggested above would then seem to have definitely materialized. Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

500.A15A5/605: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 10, 1936-1 a.m. [Received January 9-9: 35 p.m.]

40. Supplementing my 39, Jan. 9, 7 p.m.28 Eden told me it was his opinion that the so-called negotiations between China and Japan for a non-aggression pact were not as serious a matter as Craigie thought and that in a talk with the Chinese Ambassador he gathered the impression that the Chinese are discussing this idea in order to play for time but without any serious intention of consummating such a pact.

DAVIS

793.94/7635: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, January 10, 1936-10 a.m. [Received January 10-7:45 a.m.]

10. The Soviet Ambassador told me last night he had received information that the Japanese intend very shortly to land troops at

26 Vol. 1, p. 26.

Foochow and Tsingtau. Jabin Hsu of the Ministry of Finance could not confirm this but said the Japanese are tampering with naval officers under Admiral Shen, the mayor of Tsingtau, in effort to bring about declaration of autonomy by the Tsingtau Special Municipality. Repeated to Peiping.

PECK

793.94/7657: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, January 13, 1936-4 p.m. [Received January 13-2: 10 p.m.]

15. 1. Doihara 27 arrived yesterday at Tientsin. Vice Chief of Staff of Kwantung army Itagaki arrived Tientsin January 9. Manchukuo Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohashi arrived in Peiping January 4, subsequently visiting Taiyuanfu and Tsinanfu, and has allegedly returned to Manchuria. According to some reports, Itagaki has visited Tsinanfu and Tsingtau, meeting Military Attaché Isogai at the latter place.

2. These movements of important Japanese have aroused apprehension that fresh developments in the extension of Japanese control are imminent.

3. The following reasonable explanation has been advanced by a junior Japanese diplomatic official. Ohashi's trip is without much significance as he came for the purpose of "explaining" Manchukuo to Chinese leaders and without permission of the Kwantung army. Itagaki came to solve the internal Japanese military problems and will return soon to Manchuria. He confirms reports of jealousy of the Japanese North China garrison of the Kwantung army's direction of affairs in North China. However, Doihara has come to stay until the powers of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council are satisfactorily enlarged, that is, until the desired degree of autonomy has been attained in finance and in foreign affairs, which include closer relations with Manchukuo and agreement for action against Communism, and in economy.

4. Reports continue to be received to the effect that Li Shou Hsin and tractable Mongols are beginning or will shortly begin to separate Inner Mongolia in Suiyuan from Chinese authority as they have apparently done successfully in Chahar.

To Tokyo by mail.

JOHNSON

"Maj. Gen. Kenji Doihara, head of the Japanese military mission at Mukden.

793.94/7661: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, January 14, 1936-4 p.m. [Received January 14-2: 55 p.m.]

17. Embassy's 15, January 13, 4 p.m.

1. It has been announced that General Sung will appoint (without Nanking's approval) Shih Yu San as commander of the Peace Preservation Corps of Peiping. Sung has asked, however, that the Government cancel the existing order for Shih's arrest. Shih is regarded as a renegade and has frequently caused disturbances.

2. There are reports that Sun Tien Ying, who revolted in 1934, and Liu Kuei-tang, who ravaged the countryside in that year, may be given posts by Sung.

3. The Economic Committee of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was inaugurated January 11th. It is understood that its first problem is to assist the shopkeepers of Peiping, of whom 5,000 are in difficulties, to tide over Chinese New Year (January 24).

4. It is reported that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council will be inaugurated January 15 or 16 with Chen Chung Fu as head. Chen who has been living recently in Tientsin, resided 20 years in Japan where he assisted Sun Yat Sen prior to the revolution. He is said to be a violent opponent of Chiang Kai Shek.

5. It is understood that Sung and Itagaki plan to leave Peiping together today or tomorrow for Tientsin for discussion of the North China situation.

JOHNSON

793.94/7663: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

PEIPING, January 15, 1936-noon. [Received January 15-9: 15 a.m.]

18. Embassy's 17, January 14, 4 p.m.

1. In addition to appointments previously reported, Sung Che Yuan has appointed his own men to important posts in several other organizations which control revenue. These posts were previously held by appointees of Nanking.

2. The character of Sung's regime is becoming increasingly autonomous in line with Japanese desires. A junior Chinese official under Sung states that the latter intends to retain all revenues of Hopei and Chahar, remitting none to Nanking, including postal and customs revenue. The local postal authorities received notice yesterday from

« PreviousContinue »