70 Pact was designed to eliminate, namely, an Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although in somewhat altered and attenuated form. The position of the United States in the Pacific area in general and in the Far East in particular would thereby be weakened. The principal argument in favor of the conclusion of a non-aggression or some similar political pact with Japan, however, is the simple one that, if we wish to reduce the permanent danger of conflict with Japan, we shall eventually be compelled to reach some political agreement in respect to the Far East which will take into consideration the new facts and conditions mentioned previously in this despatch. It is certain that nothing short of superior force will stop Japan's advance into Asia, and as the United States and Great Britain are distinctly not inclined to employ force against Japan, while China apparently is not capable of exerting sufficient force to restrain Japan, it would appear that the only effective course which we can pursue will be to endeavor to slow up the Japanese expansionist movement by a series of agreements of limited duration, each of which would be designed to restrain Japan in one direction or another. The situation in the Far East, perhaps to a greater degree than in any other part of the world, is not static, but decidedly dynamic, and therefore does not lend itself to the conclusion of more or less permanent treaties, such as the Nine-Power Treaty was intended to be. We are now, therefore, faced with the problem of searching again for the most effective means whereby Japanese interference with American rights and interests in the Far East can be held in check, while at the same time reducing to a minimum the friction between Japan and the United States which inevitably increases the potential risk of war. A tripartite non-aggression pact, or a series of bilateral non-aggression pacts, between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, would be a step along this road. DISADVANTAGES OF NON-AGGRESSION PACTS Turning now to the disadvantages of such non-aggression pact or pacts, the first would appear to be the very meagre security which we would obtain by this means. Our past experience with Japanese observance of such treaties does not conduce to any degree of optimism in regard to the future observance by Japan of any pact designed to secure our rights and interests (or those of China) in the Far East. We would, moreover, be forfeiting, to the extent that we were bound by the tripartite or bilateral agreements, our right or privilege of cooperating with other Powers in collective action to restrain Japan-a policy which the American Government has previously 70 Signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. I, adopted, with indifferent success, in dealing with Sino-Japanese disputes and in endeavoring to implement the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the Far East. We would also to some extent lose our freedom of action and would to that degree increase Japan's freedom of action in the Far East. Against this it can be argued that the United States is already bound by the Kellogg-Briand Pact to abjure war as an instrument of national policy, and that therefore, in concluding a non-aggression or other peace pact with Japan, the United States would lose no freedom of action not already renounced. The principal argument against the conclusion of a non-aggression or similar pact with Japan, however, is that such a pact implies a political agreement, and any political agreement with Japan made now or in the foreseeable future would have to include our express or tacit acceptance of the status quo on the Asiatic mainland. It can be argued that "Manchukuo" is a political entity which does exist, irrespective of the means by which it was brought into being or by which it is being maintained in existence, and that the fact of its existence has been recognized by China and by other countries whenever they have had dealings of any kind with that country. Our recognition or non-recognition of the fact of "Manchukuo's" existence, therefore, would not greatly alter the existing situation, and it is argued that recognition by the United States of the de facto existtence of "Manchukuo" would be a small price to pay for our security, even for a limited period, in the Far East, for the lessening of the danger of war with Japan, and for obviating the necessity of entering an expensive naval construction race. On the other hand, however, even our tacit acceptance of the status quo on the Asiatic mainland would to that extent condone Japan's actions in Asia and would indicate an abandonment of the principles of world peace for the general acceptance and observance of which the United States has struggled for many years. It is not believed that the American Government and the American people are prepared to take this step, now or in the near future. CONCLUSION As was stated before, the consensus of opinion in this Embassy is that a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact is not feasible at the present time and that the disadvantages of a tripartite non-aggression pact, or a series of bilateral non-aggression pacts between the United States, Great Britain and Japan probably outweigh the advantages. Nevertheless it is believed that our Government should not neglect carefully to explore every avenue which might lead to some variety of political agreement with Japan which would tend to protect our interests in this part of the world and to reduce the friction between the United States and Japan. As was expressed by Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in 1932 (telegram No. 1078, September 8, 11 a.m."), in discussing a possible conference on the Far Eastern question in Geneva: "We must sooner or later deal with the situation which those forces (the forces driving Japan into China) have created. It is better that we deal with it now by methods of peace than later by the methods of war . . .72 "If the opportunity . . . presents itself the United States could come forward with a plan for an international conference to take up and consider the question of the situation in the East linked with such questions as the limitation of armaments and the modification of promises under the Kellogg Pact . . ." The Embassy believes that the fact that it does not consider a nonaggression pact to be desirable or feasible at the present moment does not exclude the possibility of some other form of agreement which, while not sacrificing our principles or our rights and interests, would tend to obviate to some extent, at least, the risk of armed conflict with Japan. It may be said that in times past the Japanese have considered the obligations of bilateral treaties as more compelling than those involved in general or multilateral pacts. We must also recognize that any political arrangement with Japan must take into account the fact that the attitude of Soviet Russia is an important consideration in Japanese political calculations. Pending, however, the possible conclusion of some political agreement with Japan, it is our firm belief that the primary method of supplementing the legal, moral and idealistic principles for which the United States has always stood sponsor in the Far East is to build and maintain our Navy at a strength sufficient for adequate defense in case of Japanese aggression against our rights and interests (see despatch No. 1102, December 27, 1934 73). While our Navy is not maintained for purposes of aggression, from which we are restrained by our commitments under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, plus our national policy of non-aggression, plus the practical difficulties of obtaining concrete results by war with Japan, nevertheless it is not believed that we should gratuitously sacrifice the factor of warning inherent in the possession of a strong fleet. Such a factor tends to support and implement our diplomacy if only by its psychological effect. If and when we do negotiate some political agreement with Japan in respect to the Far East, to replace the Nine-Power Treaty, we shall be in a much better position to insist upon our rights and legitimate interests if we possess a strong fleet than if we permit our naval strength to fall below that indicated for adequate defense. We should not lose "For telegram No. 1078, dated September 7, 1932, 9 p. m., see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. IV, p. 229. 12 Omissions indicated in the original. 13 Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. I, p. 821. sight of the fact, deplorable but true, that no practical and effective code of international morality upon which the world can rely has yet been discovered, and that the standards of morality of one nation in certain given circumstances have little or no relation to the standards of another nation in other circumstances, and little or no relation to the standards of the individuals of the nations in question. To shape our foreign policy on the unsound theory that other nations are guided and bound by our own present standards of international ethics would be to court sure disaster. Respectfully yours, JOSEPH C. GREW 711.94/1059a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) WASHINGTON, February 10, 1936-7 p.m. 19. For your information. When asked this afternoon to comment on Senator Pittman's speech in the Senate today," the Secretary said, only: "I have not yet had opportunity to read Senator Pittman's speech. Senator Pittman occupies an important position in the legislative branch of the Government. There has been as regards his speech no consultation or collaboration between him and me. There is no reason why I should make any comment." HULL 793.94/7719: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, February 11, 1936-3 p. m. [Received February 11-1: 18 p. m.] 59. Embassy's 44, February 4, noon. 1. Doihara arrived February 8 at Peiping from Tientsin reputedly to remain for some time. The conference of military officers at Tokyo continues and Sugiyama's departure for Manchuria and North China (see Embassy's 21, January 16, 4 p. m.) is reported as postponed until February 20. General Sung and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council apparently continue to procrastinate in proclaiming toward that degree of autonomy which the Japanese military desire. However, Doihara in two press interviews stated that the Council will have Japanese advisers; and a Japanese press report 74 Speech on Japanese policy in China by Key Pittman, Democrat, of Nevada, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Congressional Record, vol. 80, pt. 2, p. 1703. from Tsitsihar states that Shiro Nagai, director of the General Affairs Board in the Heilungkiang Provincial Government and formerly in the Tokyo Finance Bureau, will be financial adviser to the Council. 2. The Hopei-Chahar Council is considering the establishment of an education commission to supervise education, its duties probably to be restricted at the beginning to middle schools. It is understood that the commission was "suggested" by the Japanese, not "demanded". Local educators are opposed to it, claiming that such a threat to educational liberty would cause students to demonstrate again and would result in schools and universities eventually removing from Peiping. 3. Reports here that Japanese-manufactured text books are to be used in Yin Ju Keng's area are substantiated by Mukden's despatch 222, February 775 which states that the Mukden Chinese press reports that 1,500,000 primary school text books compiled by the East Asia Cultural Society are being printed in Mukden for use in the area under Yin Ju Keng. By mail to Tokyo. LOCKHART 747.94/20 The Consul General at Sydney (Moffat) to the Secretary of State No. 125 SYDNEY, February 11, 1936. [Received March 10.] SIR: There can be no doubt but that recent Japanese moves in the Orient, coupled with the attitude of her delegation at London, have seriously disturbed the Australian Government and to a lesser degree the Australian public. Last October when I visited Canberra the general attitude was that Japan would probably be occupied for many years to come digesting her acquisitions in Manchukuo and that for the time being her energies must be concentrated exclusively in that direction. Of late, however, Australia has made a radical revision in her estimates of future Japanese policy based on reports received from Tokyo, presumably from Sir Robert Clive, supported by those from her own Trade Commissioner, Major Longfield Lloyd. Both Sir George Pearce, the Minister of External Affairs, and Colonel Hodgson, the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, told me in Canberra last week that the news from Tokyo was distinctly disquieting: that there was a new and increasing access of megalomania in Japan, coupled with a growing conviction that the greatest single obstacle to the fulfilment of Japanese ambition to become Master of the Western Pacific was the British Empire. Some 75 Not printed. |