of international espionage. This latter bill failed of passage, being abandoned without a vote, whereas the former passed only after considerable revision lightening the penalties for its violation and renaming it so as to brand it as temporary, emergency legislation. All parties were opposed to these bills while the minority parties, the Kokumin Domei and the Social Mass party were most uncompromising. The Embassy will transmit a translation of the authentic text of the Seditious Literature Emergency Control Bill when available. Meanwhile there is enclosed with this despatch a clipping from the Japan Advertiser of May 26 54 setting forth the terms of the amended bill as given by the Domei news agency and including two resolutions attached by the Seiyukai and Minseito parties which emphasize the emergency nature of the law and enjoin the Government to respect freedom of speech and personal rights in applying it. The Hirota Cabinet attached great importance to these bills. As evidence of the pressure which it brought to bear on the legislators and which they in considerable measure resisted, it may be mentioned that on two occasions, one shortly after the introduction of the bill and the other while it was in committee in process of revision, rumors were circulated that the Army would seek an emergency Imperial Ordinance to effect the purposes of the Seditious Literature Bill if it failed of passage; that the Cabinet Ministers from the Seiyukai and Minseito parties were sent to implore their respective parties to modify their attitude towards the bills; that the Prime Minister, as well as the Home Minister, the Justice Minister, and the War Minister reiterated the Government's desire for the passage of the bills; and that the Diet Session was twice prolonged (for a day each time) in order to allow time for the passage of the amended Seditious Literature Control Bill. At the same time it does not appear that the Government ever elucidated the precise meaning of the bills before the Diet as a whole or that it ever dispelled the conviction that it was legislating concerning offenses against which ample remedies had already been provided by law. The nature of the controversy and the sincere as well as searching examination to which the bills were put may best be indicated by reference to points brought out by interpellators and by rebuttals on the part of the Cabinet Ministers. On May 14 Mr. Toshiyuki Hisayama of the Seiyukai stated in a lengthy interpellation on the Seditious Literature Bill that if there were freedom of speech in Japan deleterious pamphlets would cease, that if army reform took place an effective end would be put to the circulation of subversive pamphlets, that if army discipline were good, the army would be proof "Not reprinted. against the effects of subversive literature, that if the bill were passed Japan would revert to the underground politics of the closing years of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and that if it were passed the public would be at the mercy of policemen making arrests in the hopes of securing promotion. He further asked who it was that the War Minister imagined was circulating pamphlets to disturb the control of the army and whether the Government imagined that public uneasiness could be dispelled simply by law. Others emphasized that there were already enough laws and that the Government should concern itself instead with root causes while the Social Mass party, claiming seditious literature to be the reflection of prevailing social unrest, said that to legislate against it without stopping the source of the evil would only intensify the public uneasiness. Opposition to the bill was rendered especially intense by a virtual admission on the part of the Director of the Police Bureau of the Home Office that advocacy of the overthrow of the Hirota Cabinet would be regarded as sedition under the bill. Further opposition and ridicule was aroused by the Government's claim that in applying the bill the presence or absence of seditious intent on the author's part was the test of criminality; mere awareness that public disorder might result from his writings did not incriminate an author but intent to incite it would. The principal rebuttals on the part of Cabinet Ministers were brief and were repeated again and again. The Home Minister freely admitted that it was inevitable that freedom of speech and the liberty of the press should be restricted to a certain extent but declared that the bill would be carefully administered. The War Minister claimed that pamphlets were circulated for the purpose of disturbing the control of the army, not because the control of the army was lax. The Prime Minister stated that the bill was to restore peace to the public mind and prevent a repetition of the recent deplorable incident. Existing circumstances, he reiterated, made it necessary. It may be supposed that further explanations by the Government were advanced in secret committee sessions. In the foregoing paragraphs, however, is set forth the nature of the developments which terminated in the passage of the amended bill during the closing hours of the session, by the Lower House late on May 25, by the House of Peers on May 26. In reviewing the Cabinet's struggle with the Diet over these two bills it is at once obvious that large issues were involved. The Government claimed that the whole state of the nation, whose stability was called into question on February 26, needed the remedy provided by these measures. The Diet on the other hand, while fighting to preserve individual liberties from encroachment, was also aware that the rival forces of bureaucracy and militarism were arrayed in veiled but nevertheless real opposition to liberal government. In a sense the Diet was fighting to justify its existence and it acquitted itself creditably. In so doing it identified the Government in the public mind with regimentation while it clamored itself for reform not repression. The two bills considered in this despatch were the subject of great publicity and the public and press stood squarely behind the Diet in opposition to them. The following which appeared in the Yomiuri on May 28 is by no means unique and, in the light of the struggle over the sedition bill, the reference to the Government is inescapable. "There have been few times in the past at which the people were called upon in a greater degree than at present to become intelligent and display their power of unity. But on the other hand, the unpatriotic evil hand is being extended all the more to suppress speech and interfere with efforts designed to awaken the people to become more intelligent." It is still too close to the event to tell whether there is in prospect a continued damming up of natural forces which will render the national stability more precarious but, it may be pointed out, the Japanese have in the controversy over these bills, demonstrated that, subject to regimentation as they are, there is a limit to their docility. They have held out stubbornly for the preservation of their individual prerogatives. When, during a discussion of the unsuccessful Mobilization Secrets Bill, a Diet member claimed that the sanctity of conversation in that great Japanese forum, the public bath, was threatened, the bill was doomed forthwith. The Government leaders were made to realize that they could go no further. Whether this implies a change of trend cannot be predicted but the developments and considerations set forth in this despatch suggest at least that the public mind since February 26 is more healthful than the Government's projects would lead one to suppose. Respectfully yours, 894.00/661: Telegram JOSEPH C. GREW The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State 149. Embassy's 140, June 24, 7 p. m.5 TOKYO, July 7, 1936-noon. [Received July 7-1:25 a. m.] 1. War Office announcement made at 2 o'clock this morning states that of 19 officers, 75 non-commissioned officers, 19 privates and 10 civilians indicted and tried for complicity in the February 26 incident the following have been sentenced: 13 officers and 4 civilians to death; 5 officers to life imprisonment; 1 officer, 17 non-commissioned officers 55 Not printed. and 6 civilians to imprisonment of from 2 to 15 years; 27 non-commissioned officers and 3 privates to imprisonment of from 18 months to 2 years but with stay of execution for 3 years. 2. The judgment states that sentences of death and life imprisonment were pronounced upon certain officers because they had employed the Imperial Army without Imperial sanction. Some of the non-commissioned officers and privates were found to have participated knowingly in the incident but the others were acquitted because they had only obeyed the orders of their superior officers. 3. The newspapers state that no appeal will be granted. The time of execution of the death sentences was not announced but the military criminal law provides for execution by shooting within 5 days from confirmation of the sentence by the Minister of War. GREW 894.00/662: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, July 13, 1936-2 p. m. [Received July 13-3:08 a. m.] 154. Embassy's 149, July 7, noon. War Office announcement 6 p. m., July 12, names 15 persons as executed July 12 for participation in February 26 incident. These persons are the 13 officers and 2 of the 4 civilians whose death sentences were announced July 7. The two remaining civilians are presumably being held for evidence in further investigations. The press generally approves the executions and no disturbances have been reported. GREW 894.00/663: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, July 18, 1936-11 a. m. [Received July 18-2:44 a. m.] 158. Tokyo martial law repealed by Imperial ordinance effective today. GREW 894.00/668 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State No. 1955 TOKYO, July 23, 1936. [Received August 10.] SIR: I have the honor to submit the following study of the political consequences of the incident of February 26, 1936. As reported to the Department in numerous telegrams and despatches, on the morning of February 26 at Tokyo a group of young officers in the Japanese Army led several hundred troops to the residences of a number of the highest officials of the country, several such officials were assassinated, the insurgents seized a number of public buildings, martial law was declared by the Government, a few days later the insurgents surrendered and submitted to arrest, they were tried by court martial extending over several months, the leaders were sentenced to death, other conspirators were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, on July 12 most of those sentenced to death were executed, and on July 18 martial law was lifted. Confusion was the first effect of the incident. The people were at a loss to know what had occurred and what was about to occur, particularly inasmuch as a strict censorship made them susceptible to rumors as their source of knowledge of what was actually going on. There were frequent expressions of resentment against the censorship, and one newspaper went so far as to say that the incident itself would not have occurred in a community enjoying freedom of speech. But the populace quickly regained its composure by virtue of its political inertia, its general indifference to political ideas. Although the insurgents began their operations by assassinations, their use of terrorism ended there. Confining their use of violence to this dramatic opening they expected that a simple statement of their motives and program would call forth widespread popular support and lead to the changes which they advocated. They addressed the people through printed statements. Quietly and confidently they harangued the passers-by in front of the buildings which they seized. They explained that they were opposed to privilege, whether of wealth or of big business or of the misguided advisers close to the Emperor or of those Army leaders who gave in to favoritism in military promotions; they advocated a restatement of the fundamental structure of the state; they favored stabilization of the livelihood of the people of Japan; they argued for recognition of the needs of adequate defense of the country. They urged a Showa restoration in the year 1936 as brilliant and comprehensive as the Meiji restoration. But several circumstances materially weakened the appeal of the insurgents to the country. The people did not like the killing of old men in cold blood; they were opposed to the commanding of Imperial troops contrary to orders from above; they resented the threat to the Imperial palace and the Emperor in the movements of the troops controlled by the insurgents; and for the first time they were awakened to the necessity of putting a stop to the long series of political assassinations which have taken place in Japan in recent years. Stunned that the ideas of the insurgents were not sweeping the populace, and faced by inevitably heavy bloodshed if choosing resist |