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Commons perused the details of unwarrantable cruelty practised on the children in several of the Charter-schools of Ireland, contained in the report presented to both Houses of Parliament by the commissioners appointed by his Majesty for examination into the state of the schools of Ireland, and praying that his Majesty may be pleased to direct the law officers of the Crown in that part of the United Kingdom to institute criminal prosecutions against the actors, aiders, and abettors of those dreadful outrages, as far as they may be amenable to law."

Mr. Peel candidly admitted, that, from the report itself, the inference was inevitable, that the system of the charter-schools was one which did not admit of correction, but ought to be extinguished altogether, as soon as possible. He added, that the report was not two days in the possession of government, before an order was sent, prohibiting the admission of any more children upon those foundations. At the same time, he thought that, if the masters could be proved ju

dicially to have been guilty of such atrocities as were stated in the report, dismissal would not be punishment enough; they ought to be prosecuted. In that case they should have the benefit of a fair trial: and parliament ought not to interfere, so as to prevent an impartial decision, which they would do, if they adopted the words of the proposed resolution. He therefore hoped that the right hon. baronet would so far alter the wording of his motion, as not to assume the existence of the guilty practices, which were to constitute the subject of inquiry.

Sir J. Newport, in compliance with Mr. Peel's suggestion, withdrew the original resolution, and the following motion was agreed to unanimously, "That an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions to the law-officers of the Crown in Ireland to institute criminal proceedings against the persons concerned in the cruelties detailed in the report of the commissioners on Education, so far as they may be amenable to law."

CHAP. V.

Court of Chancery-Complaints on that subject Debates on the alleged Abuses in Chancery, and on the Commission for inquiring into the Practice of that Court-Regulation of the Salaries of the JudgesLaws relating to Juries-Bankrupt Law-Law of Factors and Agents-Joint-Stock Companies-Unitarians' Marriage Bill-Usury Laws-Scotch Law Proceedings.

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TONE of the great questions of constitutional law, which in times of distress the very existence of the country has been often represented as depending, were agitated this year. Parliamentary reform, and the kindred class of topics were left undisturbed: nor did any part of the country shew any symptom of dissatisfaction that such questions were not discussed. The attention of the legislature was much more beneficially directed to the improvement of the administration of justice by various changes in the laws which affect the civil relations of man and man.

The administration of justice in the court of Chancery was by far the most important subject, connected with the judicial institutions of the country, which could be brought under the consideration of the legislature: nor could any greater benefit be conferred on the public, than an improvement in a tribunal far superior to all others which have ever existed in this, or any other kingdom, both in the practical efficacy of its operations, and in the comprehensiveness of its range, and in the enlarged and liberal doctrines upon which it acts. The courts of

common law are most useful and most excellent, within their own sphere: but if their doctrines and forms were not modified by the equitable jurisdiction, they would cease to be instruments of justice, and would become intolerable nuisances, by the oppression and wrong which they might be made to work. They look only at so much of a transaction as falls within their own arbitrary definitions; there may be circumstances, not comprehended in those definitions, which entirely alter its nature: those, however, a court of law cannot look at; and it deals with the affair, as if that little portion of it which is included in a legal definition, embraced all the circumstances of the case. Even where a court of law is by its principles permitted to look at the whole of a transaction, it is from its forms incapable of doing justice, unless the matter is exceedingly simple or can be reduced to a few facts. Matters of account, for instance, may be determined either at law, or in equity; and of all the subjects discussed in equity, they are perhaps the simplest: yet so unequal does a common law tribunal find itself to grapple with this, the easiest subject of equitable jurisdiction, that actions, which involve accounts, end for the most part only in one way-in the parties being compelled, after going through all the expense of litigation, to refer the matters in dispute between them to arbitration. On the contrary, nothing is too complex for the court of Chancery. Its duty is, to deal with human transactions as it finds them; from this duty it does not shrink: it does not substitute for realities narrow definitions, but examines all their details, looks at every circumstance connected with them, and judges of them by the application of a system of principles, which have been built up by a long succession of the ablest and wisest men that ever adorned any public station, and in no specific part of which has even the wildest prater ever ventured to suggest any improvement. The most ordinary and simple species of suit in equity-a suit for the administration of the estate of a deceased trader-will often do more than could be done by an hundred actions at law.

The court of Chancery exercises, likewise, functions very different from the mere determination of litigated rights. From the mode in which property comes to be limited in a refined state of society, partial interests come successively into existence throughout a long period; and forty, or fifty, or sixty years may elapse, before there exists an absolute owner. During all this interval the court of Chancery administers the property, and secures it for the person ultimately entitled to it: and the functions which this jurisdiction silently and without noise exercises in thus administering and preserving funds, especially where

infants and married women are concerned, surpass probably, in utility, any other branch of the judicial civil administration. The greater the amount of the funds thus administered, and the longer the period during which there exists no person entitled to the absolute ownership of any given fund, the greater, obviously, is the utility of the interference of the Court: yet, strange to say, such is the sagacity of most of those who have held themselves forth as instructors of their brethren on this subject, that the very circumstances which prove the utility of the court of Chancery, have been made use of as topics of reproach against it. It has been accused loudly, because the funds which it administers amount to nearly 40 millions: and the mere circumstance that a suit may exist for half a century has been thought to carry condemnation along with it:-as if the continuance of a suit for 40 or 50 years proved any thing more, than that during that time there was no person who was entitled to the absolute possession of the fund which was the subject of it. A testator, perhaps, leaves 20,000l. to be enjoyed by his infant daughter during her life in a specified manner; and, after her death, to be divided among such of her children as shall attain twenty-one years of age. The parties choose to place this fund out of the risk of accident from the mistakes, misfortunes, or misconduct of any trustee, or executor. For this purpose a bill is filed in Chancery: the money is invested in 3 per cent stock in the name of the Accountant-general : the daughter lives perhaps 50 years, receiving the dividends regularly, and dies, leaving several children, of whom some are under age: at length the youngest attains 21, and the 20,000l. is then paid out of Court to the individuals entitled to receive it. From the commencement to the end of such a suit, sixty years or more will elapse: and during the whole of that time the 20,000l. will stand in the name of the Accountant-general.

Looking at the vast variety, and the very complicated nature, of the transactions with which the court of Chancery deals, and at the enlarged principles on which it proceeds, it would be wonderful indeed, if, in so vast a system, there was not much which might be capable of improvement; and if any set of men, from pure motives, and with adequate knowledge of the subject, had devoted themselves to the task of ascertaining what alterations might be advantageously and prudently made in the mode of administering the equitable jurisdiction, they would have merited thanks as public benefactors. Unfortunately, however, the subject fell into the hands of some rash nisi prius lawyers who were profoundly ignorant of it, and of every thing connected with it, and who seemed to be actuated merely by personal hostility to the lord chancellor, for not having conferred on them certain professional honours to which they deemed themselves entitled-not by professional eminence-but in their political capacities. That great and venerable judge was to be assailed. In himself, however, he was unassailable; for his judicial failings (if such he had) arose from his very virtues; from his apprehension of wrong; from his distrust of a judgment of which he alone was diffident; from his anxious and painful scrutiny of every matter that came before him. In learning, in saga

city, in comprehensiveness of legal views, in patient investigation, in impartial equanimity, he was admitted to be the greatest of that splendid race of sages, who have held the great seals of England : nor was there any one who could venture to deny, that lord Eldon was the judge, before whom every suitor, who believed himself to be in the right, was anxious to have his cause heard. But that which could not be done directly, might be accomplished indirectly. They might wound the feelings of the Chancellor by degrading the Court in which he had spent his life and earned so pure a fame: and gradually the degradation of the Court in public opinion would tend to lower the personal reputation of the Judge. On this system they had acted during several sessions of parliament; and it was not abandoned in the present. The commission which had been appointed in 1824, and which had not yet made its report, did not produce even a suspension of hostilities: on the contrary, it became in its turn a theme of abuse.

Two discussions of the subject took place in the present session. The first was introduced on the 31st of May by Mr. J. Williams, who, in presenting some petitions complaining of particular proceedings in Chancery, delivered a very long and very smart speech. His oration had however this peculiarity-that it was an attack, not upon the court of Chancery, but upon the whole law of England. The law of real property (of which however he declared himself completely ignorant) was the subject of his peculiar animadversion; and the most important part of his speech, if it meant any thing, went to prove, that courts of common law should cease to be so, and that the equitable and the legal jurisdiction should be confounded. If Mr. Williams uttered in parliament what the reports have ascribed to him, it is matter of no small regret that such charlatanism should be listened to by the House.* A professional man, speaking on a professional subject, should be "accurate, for it is his business to be so." On the 7th of June Sir Francis Burdett brought the subject again under discussion, by moving, that the evidence taken by the commissioners for inquiring into the practice of the court of Chancery should ould be printed. Mr. Peel opposed the motion; because to print the evidence without an accompanying report, was contrary to the practice of the House; and even if it were printed, the session was so far advanced, that no measure with respect to it could be brought forward. He was supported by Mr. Courtenay, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Tindal. Dr. Lushington supported the motion, because he thought that benefit would result from the discussion which the printing of the evidence would excite. Mr. Denman and Mr. Abercromby concurred in the same view of the question, but expressed themselves with great moderation. In the course of the discussion, sir M. W. Ridley made a remark to which his own party would have done well to attend. "He wished" he said "as much as any man to see the system altered; but he must

* For instance, can Mr. Williams make sense out of what he is reported to have said both at the beginning and the end of his speech about injunctions? What did he mean by "a court of law being the best judge of any equitable circumstances belonging to a case." &c.

&c.

object to the mode in which an individual was attacked, night after night. He was persuaded such attacks did no good; for lord Eldon stood very high in the estimation of the people of England." Mr. Brougham, however, paid little attention to the lesson; and in a debate, which till then had been conducted in a spirit of moderation suited to the subject, broke forth into an uncalled-for and indelicate attack upon lord Gifford, not less unworthy of the speaker than unjust to the virtues and talents of him against whom it was directed. The motion was rejected by a majority of 154 to 73.

A remarkable circumstance in all the debates on the court of Chancery was, that none of its assailants ventured beyond general declamation. No one specified the part of the system in which the alleged evil lay, nor ventured to propound any remedy. Such discussions, therefore, could lead to no good. They might, indeed, render the court itself the subject of popular odium: but one consequence of assailing the highest of the ordinary tribunals with unceasing abuse, was, that the general administration of justice would be in some degree lowered in general estimation: an effect as mischievous as can well be conceived. If on any subject declamation is odious, and accurate practical knowledge should be required from all who call for alteration, it is where the administration of justice is concerned.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward a measure for augmenting the salaries of the judges, and at the same time for prohibiting the sale of those ministerial offices, which the chiefs of the respective courts had pre

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