The New Democracy and the ConstitutionJ. Murray, 1912 - 211 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute accepted Act of Parliament altered artisans authority Bagehot Britain British Constitution Cabinet Cabinet government century Chancellor checks and balances citizens claims classes commonwealth Conservatives cracy dangers demands democracy democratic legislation depends devised discussion doctrine economic effective election electors England English Exchequer Executive Executive Government existence expedient favour federal force future hand House of Commons House of Lords ideals increased individual influence interests issues justice leaders Legislature Liberal liberty machinery majority rule masses means measure ment Ministers modern Monarch money bills moral national finance nature numbers opinion opponents organised Palmerstonian Parlia Parliament Act parliamentary party people's political equality popular possible practice present principles proportional representation protection realise Referendum reformers regulate representative rights of minorities safeguards schemes Second Chamber Sidney Low Socialists sovereign sovereignty sphere statute taxation theory tion to-day trade unions triumph tyranny voters voting power wage wealth
Popular passages
Page 4 - It is a partnership in all science ; a partnership in all art ; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.
Page 28 - Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment ; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Page 154 - BY OUR SHERIFFS AND BAILIFFS, ALL OTHERS WHO HOLD OF US IN CHIEF, FOR A...
Page 164 - The function of Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the powers of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the powers of Parliaments.
Page 32 - The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation.
Page 123 - I can conceive of nothing more corrupting or worse for a set of poor ignorant people than that two combinations of well-taught and rich men should constantly offer to defer to their decision, and compete for the office of executing it. Vox populi will be Vox diaboli if it is worked in that manner.
Page 106 - The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or rather of that party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in carrying elections. To break off that point is to avert the danger. The common system of representation perpetuates the danger. Unequal electorates afford no security to majorities. Equal electorates give none to minorities.
Page 71 - I have said that cabinet government is possible in England because England was a deferential country. I meant that the nominal constituency was not the real constituency; that the mass of the 'ten-pound' householders did not really form their own opinions, and did not exact of their representatives an obedience to those opinions; that they were in fact guided in their judgment by the better-educated classes; that they preferred representatives from those classes, and gave those representatives much...
Page 71 - But the mass of the old electors did not analyse very much : they liked to have one of their "betters" to represent them ; if he was rich, they respected him much; and if he was a lord, they liked him the better. The issue put before these electors was which of two rich people will you choose ? And each of those rich people was put forward by great parties whose notions were the notions of the rich — whose plans were their plans. The electors only selected one or two wealthy men to carry out the...