be necessary to excite his industry, and to inspire him with the desire of accumulating. But if, in order to carry this principle to the furthest extent, individuals were allowed to chalk out an endless series of heirs, and to prescribe the conditions under which they shall successively hold the property, it would be taken entirely out of the market; it might be prevented from ever coming into the hands of those who would turn it to the best account; and it could neither be farmed nor managed in any way, however advantageous, that happened to be inconsistent with the directions in the will. To establish such a system, would evidently be most impolitic; and hence, in regulating the transfer of property by will, a term should be fixed, beyond which the instructions of the testator should have no effect. It is, of course, impossible to lay down any general rule for determining this period. According to the law of England, a man is allowed to fix the destination of his property until the first unborn heir be twenty-one years of age, when his will ceases to have any farther control over it. This is perhaps as judicious a term as could be devised. It gives every necessary inducement to accumulation, at the same time that it hinders the tying up of property for too long a period. In Scotland it is lawful to settle or entail estates upon an endless series of heirs; but repeated Acts of Parliament have been passed to obviate some of the defects incident to this system; and it is probable that it will, at no distant period, undergo still more essential alterations.'-P. 262. The subjects comprised in these paragraphs deserve more complete developement than could be devoted to them in an elementary work of political economy. They are among the subjects which demand the early interference of the legislature. In Scotland, if the right of entailing is allowed to continue, an entire severance of the productive classes from the owners of the land must ensue. There will be an impassable gulf between them. If Scotland existed as an independent state, one of two things would happen from the progress of this system,-the small body of landholders would acquire a degree of political power altogether inconsistent with the prosperity of other classes, or they would be swept away by the indignation and envy of the people. But even in England, the law is not so clear or perfect as the author supposes, and it is very probable that there also the interference of the legislature will be required. He has expressed, in popular language, one interpretation of the rule which has regulated settlements of property there. The rule has been, that the final vesting of property, and, consequently, the power of alienating it, may be suspended for any number of lives in being, and a period of twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of them. But questions have arisen, 1stly, Whether the lives shall be understood to be those of persons entitled to the temporary enjoyment of the property which is the subject of the settlement, or of any persons, indiscriminately taken, (this last interpretation seems now scarcely to be questioned;) and, 2dly, Whether or no the period of twenty-one years must be referred to the minority of some person who may be an infant at the time of the expiration of the last life, and who, in the event of his attaining full age, shall have the absolute dominion of the property. At first sight, it may appear to be of little importance in which way the questions are answered; but if we examine the effects of the two species of settlement to which they refer, we shall find that one interpretation of the law will bring us to the rule which fixes, according to our author, as judicious a term as could be devised; while the other will lead to a system approaching, in its practical effects, to the unlimited power of entail subsisting in Scotland. We may very briefly explain the operation of the two rules. It happens, almost universally, that some one family is the object of the bounty of a testator, if not exclusively, decidedly in preference to all others. Under the system of settlement according to the notion of Mr M'Culloch, and which has been in fact common in England, a testator gives a life interest to the person who is to form the stock of the family in which he desires the property to descend-for instance, his child or grandchild, then in being; and the settlement is so framed, that when the first son of that first taker attains the age of twenty-one, the father and son together, if both be living, or the son alone, if the father be then dead, shall have the power of disposing of the property. And though it was practicable to defer the vesting of the property till the death of the tenant, or last tenant for life; yet, as the prolongation of the settlement, by such means, was uncertain, and the inconveniences certain, the vanity of testators was not often induced to eke out in this way their post-obituary authority. We might, probably, take thirty years as the average term, within which, property settled according to the ordinary mode, became finally vested for the purposes of alienation; and as it was impossible to flatter the imagination with the perpetuity of possession, powers to sell and exchange, if land was the subject of the settlement, were commonly vested in some persons in the meantime; so that it was rather a given amount of property, than a particular tract of land, which was, even for the moderate time we have mentioned, rendered inalienable. Marriage settlements have been framed on the same plan; but as the first unborn heirs con VOL. LII. NO. CIV. 2 A templated in those instruments, commonly present themselves with laudable promptitude, the portions of property subject to them were commonly tied up, on the average, for a shorter term of years. If, on the other hand, we take a large number of healthy young persons, a hundred, for example, in the ranks of life most favourable to longevity, there is a moral certainty that some one of them will live nearly a century. If, therefore, it be lawful for a testator to direct, that during the life of the survivor of such a number of infants, enumerating, for example, all the children, now born, of all the barons of the United Kingdom, and a term of twenty-one years from the death of that survivor, his property shall descend in a given line, and shall not become wholly vested or alienable, till the expiration of the last mentioned term, with the possibility that after all it may vest in an infant; any portion of property may be tied up for a period which can scarcely fall short of a century, and may, perhaps, considerably exceed it. Whether such a mode of settlement is lawful, is actually a question now under litigation in England. Two considerable settlements have been framed on this plan-one of the great property of the Duke of Bridgewater, the other of the property of a rich merchant of Bristol. The validity of the last of these has been questioned. An eminent judge (the present Master of the Rolls) has decided in its favour; but there is an appeal against the judgment pending in the House of Lords. * If such a mode of settlement be lawful and become habitual, it will not differ materially in its results from the system of entailing prevalent in Scotland; and that, if it be once clearly and notoriously lawful, it will become habitual, the experience of this part of the island warrants us in asserting. It has been, indeed, argued by Englishmen, that the small number of instances in which the attempt has yet been made to frame settlements of this description, shows that there is no tendency to abuse the power. But the fact is to be accounted for on suppositions more reasonable than that of the absence in England alone of the vanity which leads testators to avail themselves of the utmost power of tying up property which the law allows them. The law on the subject is of modern and gradual growth. Where the law, as in England, is a constant matter of doubt and debate, and where every thing which is firm The case is reported under the name of Bengough v. Edridge, ir the first volume of Simons's Reports. and settled becomes so by repeated decisions of the judges, the cautious persons who manage the settlement of property are very slow to go to the limits of that which is safe. Even when a rule is first apparently established by a decision, it is not rashly trusted to. Some one tries it, like a boy first venturing on unsound ice, with trembling knees, dreading to be let through some crack or cranny, of which the apparent soundness of the surface has not given sufficient notice. If the first adventurer is not swamped, another and another experiment is made; and when the firmness is fully established, crowds rush on with the hardihood with which loungers and dealers in whisky and gingerbread ultimately trust their lives and possessions to the assurance of the frost. The interference of the legislature will be required to make the rule of law reasonable and certain; and there is no conceivable reason why the rule, when the best one is ascertained, should not be extended to Scotland as well as England. We must here conclude our notice of this able and useful publication. As our observations have been limited to one or two important topics, they afford a very inadequate view of its contents. It is, therefore, proper to add, that we consider it as by much the best manual of Political Economy, as the science now stands, that has yet been presented to the world, either in our own, or any other language with which we are acquainted. ART. IV.-Statement of the Civil Disabilities and Privations affecting Jews in England. 8vo. London: London: 1829. THE HE distinguished member of the House of Commons, who, towards the close of the late Parliament, brought forward a proposition for the relief of the Jews, has given notice of his intention to renew it. The force of reason, last session, carried it through one stage, in spite of the opposition of power. Reason and power are now on the same side; and we have little doubt that they will conjointly achieve a decisive victory. In order to contribute our share to the success of just principles, we propose to pass in review, as rapidly as possible, some of the arguments, or phrases claiming to be arguments, which have been employed to vindicate a system full of absurdity and injustice. The constitution-it is said-is essentially Christian; and therefore to admit Jews to office, is to destroy the constitution. Nor is the Jew injured by being excluded from political power. For no man has any right to power. A man has a right to his property;-a man has a right to be protected from personal in jury. These rights the law allows to the Jew, and with these rights it would be atrocious to interfere. But it is a mere matter of favour to admit any man to political power; and no man can justly complain that he is shut out from it. We cannot but admire the ingenuity of this contrivance for shifting the burden of the proof from off those to whom it properly belongs, and who would, we suspect, find it rather cumbersome. Surely no Christian can deny that every human being has a right to be allowed every gratification which produces no harm to others, and to be spared every mortification which produces no good to others. Is it not a source of mortification to any class of men that they are excluded from political power? If it be, they have, on Christian principles, a right to be freed from that mortification, unless it can be shown that their exclusion is necessary for the averting of some greater evil. The presumption is evidently in favour of toleration. It is for the persecutor to make out his case. The strange argument which we are considering would prove too much even for those who advance it. If no man has a right to political power, then neither Jew nor Christian has such a right. The whole foundation of government is taken away. But if government be taken away, the property and the persons of men are insecure, and it is acknowledged that men have a right to their property and to personal security. If it be right that the property of men should be protected, and if this can only be done by means of government, then it must be right that government should exist. Now, there cannot be government unless some person or persons possess political power. Therefore it is right that some person or persons should possess political power. That is to say, some person or persons must have a right to political power. It will hardly be denied that government is a means for the attainment of an end. If men have a right to the end, they have a right to this—that the means shall be such as will accomplish the end. It is because men are not in the habit of considering what the end of government is, that Catholic disabilities and Jewish disabilities have been suffered to exist so long. We hear of essentially Protestant governments and essentially Christian governments-words which mean just as much as essentially Protestant cookery, or essentially Christian horsemanship. Government exists for the purpose of keeping the peace,—for the purpose of compelling us to settle our disputes by arbitration, instead of settling them by blows,-for the purpose of compelling us to supply our wants by industry, instead of supplying them by rapine. This is the only operation for which the machinery |