Recent British Philosophy: A Review, with Criticisms

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Macmillan, 1867 - 273 pages
 

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Page 155 - Thou makest thine appeal to me: I bring to life, I bring to death: The spirit does but mean the breath: I know no more.
Page 155 - Who roll'd the psalm to wintry skies, Who built him fanes of fruitless prayer, Who trusted God was love indeed And love Creation's final law Tho...
Page 65 - This is dispensed ; and what surmounts the reach Of human sense I shall delineate so, By likening spiritual to corporal forms, As may express them be:-t ; though what if earth Be but the shadow of heaven, and things therein Each to other like, more than on earth is thought...
Page 18 - An Introduction to Mental Philosophy, on the Inductive Method. By JD MORELL, MA LL.D. 8vo. 12s. Elements of Psychology, containing the Analysis of the Intellectual Powers. By the same Author. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d. The Secret of Hegel: being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter.
Page 156 - No more? A monster then, a dream, A discord. Dragons of the prime, That tare each other in their slime, Were mellow music match'd with him. O life as futile, then, as frail! O for thy voice to soothe and bless! What hope of answer, or redress? Behind the veil, behind the veil.
Page 224 - If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypolhesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Page 100 - The sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be, believed.
Page 180 - Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself...
Page 137 - We see no ground for believing that anything can be the object of our knowledge except our experience, and what can be inferred from our experience by the analogies of experience itself; nor that there is any idea, feeling, or power in the human mind, which, in order to account for it, requires that its origin should be referred to any other source.
Page 93 - It is not an object, of knowledge ; but its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned.

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