Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, Volume 1Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869 - 856 pages |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstract action adjectives alimentary canal Analysis animal antece antecedent applied Aristotle asso Association Psychology attention attributes belief called cause Classification colour combination complex idea conceive conjunction connected connexion connotation consciousness consequent contiguity Copula denote derived distinct distinguish effect evidence example excited existence experience explained expression fact feeling Genus hearing horse Imagination important included indefinite number individual inseparable association instance intellectual James Mill John John Stuart Mill language law of association manner mark meaning memory mental mind mode motion muscular names of action nature Nominalists nouns substantive objects occasion organ pain Parmenides particular peculiar person phenomena philosophers Plato pleasure possibilities of sensation Predication present proposition purpose rational remarkable remember repetition resemblance rose seen sensations of sight sense sensibility sight signifies smell sound speak species substantive supposed syllogism synchronous taste term theory thing thought tion touch train verb word
Popular passages
Page 374 - The Ideas of Goblins and Sprights have really no more to do with Darkness than Light : Yet let but a foolish Maid inculcate these often on the Mind of a Child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives ; but Darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful Ideas, and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than the other.
Page xxi - I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings ; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not...
Page xx - I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.
Page 60 - All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.
Page 374 - The ideas of goblins- and sprights have really no more to do with darkness than light; yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives; but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.
Page 73 - Our ideas spring up, or exist, in the order in which the sensations existed, of which they are the copies.
Page 122 - I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds without clear and distinct significations.
Page 447 - As already remarked, the constant antecedent of a sensation is seldom another sensation, or set of sensations, actually felt. It is much oftener the existence of a group of possibilities, not necessarily including any actual sensations, except such as are required to show that the possibilities are really present. Nor are actual sensations indispensable even for this purpose; for the presence of the object (which is nothing more than the immediate presence of the possibilities) may be made known...
Page 439 - ... character of each of the sensations composing the group ; in other words, as a kind of permanent substratum, under a set of passing experiences or manifestations : which is another leading character of our idea of substance or matter, as distinguished from sensation. Let us now take into consideration another of the general characters of our experience, namely, that in addition to fixed groups, we also recognise a fixed Order in our sensations; an Order of succession, which, when ascertained...
Page 88 - Some ideas are by frequency and strength of association so closely combined, that they cannot be separated. If one exists, the others exist along with it, in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin them. For example; it is not in our power to think of colour, without thinking of extension; or of solidity, without figure.