of them, with names given to them; and thofe have been these three Thinking and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. Thefe fimple ideas, I fay, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been moft modified, and out of whofe modification have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are converfant, it is no wonder that the feveral modes of thinking and motion fhould be taken notice of, the ideas of them obferved, and laid up in the memory, and have names affigned to them, without which laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorder repreffed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without fuch complex ideas, with names to them; and therefore men have fettled names, and fuppofed fettled ideas, in their minds, of modes of actions diftinguished by their caufes, means, objects, ends, inftruments, time, place, and other circumftances; and also of their powers fitted for thofe actions, v. g. boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend before others, without fear or diforder; and the Greeks call the confidence of fpeaking by a peculiar name, appnoía, which power or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the fame thing, is that idea. we name habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occafion to break into action, we call it difpofition. Thus teftiness is a difpofition or aptnefs to be angry. To conclude, let us examine any mode of action, v. g. confideration and affent, which are actions of the mind; running and speaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both toge and we fhall find them but fo many collections of fimple ideas, which together make up the complex ones fignified by thofe names. ther; § 11. Several Words feeming to fignify action, fignify but the Effect. POWER being the fource from whence all action proceeds, the fubftances wherein thefe powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called caufes; and the fubftances which thereupon are produced, or the fimple ideas which are introduced into any fubject by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy whereby the new fubftance or idea is produced, is called, in the fubject exerting that power, action; but in the fubject wherein any fimple idea is changed or produced, it is called paffion; which efficacy, however various, and the effects almoft infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing elfe but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing elfe but modifications of motion. I fay, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but thefe two: For whatever fort of action, befides these, produces any effects, I confefs myself to have no notion nor idea of, and fo it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehenfions, and knowledge, and as much in the dark to me as five other fenfes, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man; and therefore many words, which feem to exprefs fome action, fignify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with fome circumstances of the fubject wrought on, or cause operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And, when a country man fays the cold freezes water, though the word freezing feems to import fome action, yet truly it fignifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid, is become hard and confiftent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done. 12. Mixed Modes made alfo of other Ideas. I THINK I fhall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other fimple ideas, and their feveral combinations, are not excluded; much lefs, I think, will it be neceffary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been fettled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made ufe of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and feveral other fciences. All that is requifite to my prefent defign, is to fhow what fort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compofitions made up of fimple ideas got from fenfation and reflection, which, I fuppofe, I have done.. TH CHAP. XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES, 61. Ideas of Subflances, how made. HE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the fimple ideas, conveyed in by the fenfes, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice alfo, that a certain number of thefe fimple ideas go conftantly together; which being prefumed to belong to one thing, and words being fuited to common apprehenfions, and made ufe of for quick dispatch, are called, fo united in one fubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we. are apt afterwards to talk of, and confider, as one fimple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: Because, as I have faid, not imagining how thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themfelves, we accuftom ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum wherein they do fubfift, and from which they do refult; which therefore we call fubftance. § 2. Our Idea of Subftance in general. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure fubftance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a fuppofition of he knows not what fupport of fuch qualities, which are capable of producing fimple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one fhould be afked, What is the fubject wherein colour or weight inheres? he would have nothing to fay, but the folid ex-tended parts: And if he were demanded, What is it that folidity and extenfion inhere in? he would not be in a much better cafe than the Indian before mentioned, who, faying that the world was fupported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant refted on; to which his anfwer was, A great tortoife. But being again preffed to know what gave fupport to the broadbacked tortoife, replied, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cafes where we use words without having clear and diftinct ideas, we talk like children, who being questioned what fuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this fatisfactory anfwer, That it is fomething: which, in truth, fignifies no more, when fo ufed either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diftinct idea of at all, and fo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing but the fuppofed, but unknown, fupport of thofe qualities we find exifting, which we imagine cannot fubfist fine re substante, without fomething to fupport them, we call that fupport fubflantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, ftanding under, or upholding. 3. Of the forts of Substances. AN obfcure and relative idea of fubftance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particu lar forts of fubftances, by collecting fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are, by experience and obfervation of mens fenfes, taken notice of to exift together, and are therefore fuppofed to flow from the particular internal conftitution, or unknown eflence of that fubftance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a inan, horse, gold, water, &c. of which fubftances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain fimple ideas co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities obfervable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of thofe fubftances, which a fmith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philofopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances than what is framed by a col lection of thofe fimple ideas which are to be found in them only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of fubftances, befides all those fimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift. And therefore, when we fpeak of any fort of fubftance, we fay, it is a thing having fuch or fuch qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; fpirit, a thing capable of thinking; and fo hardnefs, friability, and power to draw iron, we fay, are qualities to be found in a loaditone. Thefe, and the like fashions of fpeaking, intimate, that the fubftance is fuppofed always fomething befides the extenfion, figure, folidity, motion, thinking, or other obfervable ideas, though we know not what it is. § 4. No clear Idea of Subftance in general. HENCE, when we talk or think of any particular fort of corporeal fubftances, as horfe, ftone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of thofe feveral fimple ideas of fenfible qualities, which we ufe to find united in the thing called horfe or ftone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should fubfift alone, nor one in another, we fuppofe them exifting in and fupported by fome common fubject; which fupport we denote by the name Subftance, though it be certain we have no clear or diftinct idea of that thing we fuppose a support. § 5. As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body. THE fame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reafoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to fubfift of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of fome other fubftance, which we call fpirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but fomething wherein thofe many fenfible qualities which affect our fenfes, do fubfift; by fuppofing a fubftance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving,. &c. do fubfift, we have as clear a notion of the fubftance of fpirit, as we have of body; the one being fuppofed |