Economics as the Basis of Living Ethics: A Study in Scientific Social PhilosophyAllen Book and Printing Company, 1913 - 373 pages |
Other editions - View all
Economics as the Basis of Living Ethics; A Study in Scientific Social Philosophy John Gormley Murdoch No preview available - 2019 |
Economics as the Basis, of Living Ethics: A Study in Scientific Social ... John Gormley Murdoch No preview available - 2015 |
Common terms and phrases
abstract accept actual apriorism aspect Austrian school become Boehm-Bawerk capital capitalist causal causes Clark Clarkian conceived concepts concrete consciousness creative contribution culture demand distribution divine duty economic determinism economists elements enterprizer equality ethics exchange existence experience exploitation express external fact final forces freedom future Hence human idea ideals imputation individual institutions interest interest-getter justice Kant Kant's Kantian Khammurabi labor power labor units less machine marginal marginal utility mass material matter means ment mental merely Moore's Laws moral needs nomic objective perfect competition physical physiological physiological necessities possible present presuppositions principles problem Prof profits proposition psychology pure reason question rational reality religious schematic seek sense serfdom simply slave slavery social contract social relations society theory things time-preferences tion to-day truth valuations wages whole wholly
Popular passages
Page 258 - That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action \ has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.
Page 266 - Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over-hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin.
Page 260 - The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will.
Page 251 - NOTHING can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.
Page 250 - Thou shalt not lie," is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the...
Page 262 - I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.
Page 253 - For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely, that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.
Page 275 - ... man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature.
Page 279 - The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes determining it...
Page 269 - In actual fact it is absolutely impossible for experience to establish with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action in other respects right has rested solely on moral grounds and on the thought of one's duty.