The Philosophical Works of David Hume ...A. Black and W. Tait, 1826 |
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Common terms and phrases
actions advantage agreeable animal appear argument arise Atheists attended beauty benevolence betwixt cause cerning character circumstances Cleanthes common concerning connexion consider contrary degree Deity Demea derived double relation effect emotion entirely esteem evil excite experience farther feel force give greater human nature hypothesis imagination immediately infer influence interest ject judgment justice and injustice kind love and hatred love or hatred mankind manner matter ment mind misery motive necessity neral never notion object obligation observe operation original ourselves pain particular person Philo philosophers philosophical scepticism pleasure possession present pride and humility pride or humility principles proceed produce promises qualities quire racter reason regard relation of ideas religion render resemblance rience rules scepticism SECT sensation sense sensible sentiments sion society species supposed sympathy thing thought tion tis evident tis impossible transition tural twill uneasiness vice and virtue virtue and vice
Popular passages
Page 228 - I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
Page 504 - Dire was the tossing, deep the groans : Despair Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch ; And over them triumphant Death his dart Shook, but delay'd to strike, though oft invoked With vows, as their chief good, and final hope.
Page 228 - For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation...
Page 426 - Passion and apathy, and glory and shame, Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy: Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm Pain for a while, or anguish, and excite Fallacious hope, or arm the obdured' breast With stubborn patience as with triple steel.
Page 228 - ... how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.
Page 227 - Take any action allow'd to be vicious: wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.
Page 162 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Page 506 - Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next twenty, they say, will be better: And from the dregs of life, hope to receive What the first sprightly running could not give.
Page 442 - ... cause of any one event; much less, of the whole of things or of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would never, of himself, give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.
Page 161 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.