Selections, Volume 10C. Scribner's sons, 1927 - 401 pages |
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absurdity actions analogy animal Anthropomorphites appear approbation argument arise ascribe assert Atheists attributes belief benevolence betwixt body causation cause and effect cerning circumstances CLEANTHES common conceive concerning conclusion connexion consequences consider constant conjunction continu'd existence contradiction contrary cosmogony dæmons Deity DEMEA deriv'd discover dispute distinct divine endeavour enquiry entirely event evident experience faculties farther feel give HERMIPPUS Hesiod human nature human reason Hume hypothesis idea imagination impossible impression inference infinite influence instances intelligent kind mankind manner mind moral motion necessity never nexion observe operation opinion origin ourselves particular passions perceive perceptions perfect personal identity PHILO philosophical scepticism philosophy polytheism present pretend principles produce Professor of English propensity Pyrrhonism question reflection regard relation religion resemblance rience scepticism seems senses sensible qualities sentiment shou'd similar society species suppose supposition theism thing thought tion Twill universe virtue vulgar whole wou'd
Popular passages
Page 193 - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number'} No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Page 84 - For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 84 - I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death...
Page 83 - THERE are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF ; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.
Page 157 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.
Page 324 - It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God ; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step beyond the mundane system you only excite an inquisitive humour, which it is impossible ever to satisfy.
Page 156 - ... is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection. Nothing farther is in the case.
Page 3 - The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other.
Page 86 - This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects. However at one instant we may consider the related succession as variable or interrupted, we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity and regard it as invariable and uninterrupted. Our propensity to this mistake is so great from...
Page 29 - ... all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twillrbe easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle.