Problems of Empiricism: Volume 2: Philosophical Papers

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, 1985 M06 30 - 255 pages
Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work.
 

Contents

III
1
IV
5
V
8
VI
12
VII
15
VIII
21
IX
25
X
34
XXVII
168
XXVIII
170
XXIX
172
XXX
173
XXXI
175
XXXII
177
XXXIII
179
XXXIV
182

XI
52
XII
65
XIII
80
XIV
89
XV
99
XVI
131
XVIII
132
XIX
133
XX
135
XXI
136
XXII
140
XXIII
142
XXIV
144
XXV
147
XXVI
162
XXXV
185
XXXVI
190
XXXVII
191
XXXVIII
192
XXXIX
197
XL
201
XLI
202
XLII
231
XLIII
233
XLIV
241
XLV
247
XLVI
248
XLVII
252
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

About the author (1985)

A controversial and influential voice in the philosophy of science, Paul K. Feyerabend was born and educated in Vienna. After military service during World War II and further study at the University of London, he returned to Vienna as a lecturer at the university. In 1959, having taught for several years at Bristol University in England, he came to the United States to join the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley, from which, after numerous visiting appointments elsewhere, he retired in 1990. Since the 1970s, Feyerabend has devoted much of his career to arguing that science as practiced cannot be described, let alone regulated, by any coherent methodology, whether understood historically, as in Thomas Kuhn's use of paradigms, or epistemologically, as in classical positivism and its offspring. He illustrates this stance on the dust jacket of one of his books, Against Method (1975), by publishing his horoscope in the place usually reserved for a biographical sketch of the author. In his entry in the Supplement to Who's Who in America, he is quoted as saying, "Leading intellectuals with their zeal for objectivity are criminals, not the liberators of mankind."

Bibliographic information