The History of Philosophy: From Thales to Comte, Volume 2Longmans, Green, 1871 |
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abstract admit Albertus Magnus animals argument Aristotle assert atheism Auguste Comte Averroes Bacon believe Berkeley body Bruno called cause Comte conceive conception conclusion Condillac Consciousness declared deduction denied Descartes distinction doctrine Dugald Stewart error essence existence experience external fact faculties Fichte forced Gall Giordano Bruno Hegel Hobbes human Hume hypothesis Idealism images induction infinite Innate Ideas intellect Intuition judgment Kant Kant's knowledge KUNO FISCHER laws Leibnitz Locke Locke's logical mathematical matter means mental metaphysical Method mind monad moral nature never notions objects Ontology opinions organs passage perceive perception phenomena Philos Philosophy Phrenology physical position posteriori principles priori proposition Psychology question reality reason relation remark Roger Bacon Roscellinus says Scepticism Scholasticism scientific sensation sense Sensibility simple soul Space speculations Spinoza spirit subjective Substance supposed Theology theory things thinker thought tion true truth understand universal words writings
Popular passages
Page 238 - For words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.
Page 296 - So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman...
Page 256 - If it shall be demanded, then, when a man begins to have any ideas ? I think, the true answer is, When he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are co-eval with sensation...
Page 300 - It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real ', distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction.
Page 261 - SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.
Page 259 - I think it is easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas, produced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain...
Page 236 - For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny ? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war, introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence,. which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that malicious question, and...
Page 301 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.
Page 331 - Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing...
Page 309 - For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not.