Law, Economics and Antitrust: Towards a New PerspectiveEdward Elgar Publishing, 2005 M01 1 - 405 pages . . . those who are dealing with antitrust issues the book is very useful and if somebody has already acquired the basic economic principles underlying antitrust regimes, one should read [this] book. . . Pal Bela Szilagyi and Dorina Juhasz, Erasmus Law an |
Contents
1 Law economics and antitrust | 1 |
2 Ownership and property rights | 31 |
3 The law and economics of contracting | 57 |
4 Liability and laws indeterminacy | 95 |
5 Liberties essential facilities and workable competition | 119 |
6 Nonnegativity and obligation | 161 |
7 Regulatory signalling labelling and credible threats | 183 |
8 Competitive harm and public policy | 207 |
9 Nonmarket economics | 237 |
10 The reach of the law | 259 |
scramble combat and contest | 283 |
12 The value of competition law | 309 |
Postscript recent developments in competition law and related issues | 337 |
| 365 | |
| 387 | |
Common terms and phrases
accident agreement allocation anticompetitive argued assessment bargaining behaviour cartel Chapter collective dominance collusion Commission compensation competition law competition policy competitive price competitors consumers contest contract curve court decision defined distribution dominant position economic analysis Economic Review vol efficient entry enforcement entrant entry barriers equilibrium European example exchange fact-finder firm's incentive increase incumbent individual industry innovation issue Journal law and economics legal rules liability marginal cost market power market share market system maximise McNutt measure merger monopolist moral hazard national competition agencies natural monopoly negative liberty neo-classical non-market economics number of firms oligopoly opportunity cost optimal organisation outcome output ownership Pareto perfect competition player positive liberty predatory pricing profits property rights regulation regulatory rent-seeking rents rival s-firm shareholding social stakeholders strategy tacit collusion theory tortfeasor transaction costs type of competition vertical restraints welfare work-effort workable competition worker-stakeholders workers x-inefficiency