 ... all the sensations and perceptions which we have of the material world may be only ideas in our own minds : it is barely possible, therefore, that matter should have no existence. But that mind — that the sentient principle — that the thing or...  Works - Page 40by Henry Brougham Baron Brougham and Vaux - 1872Full view - About this book
 | 1835 - 1024 pages
...existence. But that mind, that the sentient principle, that the thing or the being which we call / and We, and which thinks, feels, reasons, should have...more certain than that of matter apart from mind." — Of revealed religion his Lordship always speaks respectfully. Occasionally, indeed, we have thought... | |
 | Henry Brougham Baron Brougham and Vaux - 1835 - 324 pages
...that mind — that the sentient principle — that the thing or the being which we call "/" and "ice," and which thinks, feels, reasons — should have no...future existence becomes the subject of discussion. At * Sect. V. and Note IV. present we have only to keep steadily in view the undoubted fact, that mind... | |
 | Henry Brougham Baron Brougham and Vaux - 1835 - 340 pages
...principle—that the thing or the being which we call "/" and "we," and which thinks, feels, reasons—should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms. Of...future existence becomes the subject of discussion. At * Sect. V. and Note IV D 3 present we have only to keep steadily in view the undoubted fact, that mind... | |
 | Henry Brougham Baron Brougham and Vaux - 1835 - 206 pages
...mind — that the sentient principle — that the thing or the being which we call " /" and " ive," and which thinks, feels, reasons — should have no...from mind. In a subsequent branch of this discourse,* w£ shall have occasion to treat again of this question, when the constitution of the soul with reference... | |
 | Henry Brougham Baron Brougham and Vaux - 1835 - 272 pages
...that the thing or the being which we call "/" and "ice," and which thinks, feels, reasons,—should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms. Of...subsequent branch of this discourse, * we shall have * Sect . V. and Note IV. occasion to treat again of this question, when the constitution of the soul... | |
 | Thomas Wallace - 1835 - 198 pages
...existence, but, that mind, the sentient principle — that the thing or the being which we call / or we, should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms : of the two existences, then, that of mind independent of matter, is more certain than that of matter apart from mind.'' Now here again we have... | |
 | Robert Walsh, Eliakim Littell, John Jay Smith - 1835 - 1138 pages
...should have no existence, he considers to be a contradiction in terms, and that of the two existences, that of mind as independent of matter is more certain than that of matter independent of rnind. This is a part of the work of unsurpassed power. The fourth section shows that... | |
 | Thomas Wallace - 1835 - 184 pages
...we, should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms : of the two existences, then, that of mind independent of matter, is more certain than that of matter apart from mind." Now here again we have nothing but repeated assumption of the thing to be proved — viz. : First,... | |
 | Thomas Turton - 1836 - 396 pages
...principle—that the thing or the being, which we call "/" and "tee," and which thinks, feels, reasons—should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms. Of...more certain than that of matter apart from mind." (p. 56.) Had His Lordship been content to maintain that " the evidence of mind [arising from consciousness... | |
 | 1837 - 670 pages
...should " have no existence. But that mind — that sentient princi" pie — that the thing or being we call " I " and " we," and " which thinks, feels,...more certain than that of " matter apart from mind." His lordship returns to the subject several times, and especially in a note directed against the "... | |
| |
