When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, " there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. The Works of James Abram Garfield - Page 411by James Abram Garfield - 1882Full view - About this book
| 1984 - 1220 pages
...judicial departments should be separate and distinct. Ibid. Thus, Madison explained, quoting Montesquieu : "When the legislative and. executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there ean be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or... | |
| David F. Epstein - 2008 - 245 pages
...powers most effectually to mankind's attention, and quotes part of Montesquieu's explanation. .[127]. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise [on peut craindre] lest the... | |
| Francis Dunham Wormuth, Edwin Brown Firmage - 1989 - 380 pages
...threefold analysis of powers. The political value of liberty requires that these three be separated. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate... | |
| United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary - 1989 - 1346 pages
...constitutions. Montesquieu (expanding upon John Locke) is drawn upon by Madison in The Federalist.*/ No. 47: "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the sane body of magistrates, there can be no liberty...." "Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary... | |
| David P. Currie - 1994 - 682 pages
...THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34-35 (rev. ed. 1937), had explicitly invoked at the Convention: "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can then be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or... | |
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